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A study of the perceived quality factors and methods of awarding salary increases 
for superintendents in selected school districts 
by 
Thomas John Behounek 
William K. Poston, Major Professor 
Iowa State University 
Forty-four Iowa school board presidents and superintendents from the same 
school districts were surveyed to investigate and analyze perceptions of the manner in 
which superintendents are currently being awarded salary increases and the preferred or 
ideal manner in which salary increases should be awarded. Secondly, a sample of board 
members, administrators, teachers, students, and support staff from these same forty-four 
school districts were asked to respond to a Perceived Quality instrument concerning a 
quality rating of the school districts. The results of these surveys were compiled to 
determine whether a correlation existed between the current and ideal manner of 
awarding salary increases to superintendents and the perceived quality rating of the 
school. This study was conducted to test the theory of W. Edwards Deming that merit or 
performance will destroy the organization. 
The results of the study indicate the following conclusions in the current practice 
of awarding salary increases; 
(1) Board presidents and superintendents agreed that increases or decreases in 
student population have little effect in determining salary increases. 
(2) Board presidents and superintendents felt that teacher negotiated contract 
settlements have a large impact on the superintendent's salary increase. 
(3) Board presidents and superintendents agreed that standardized testing should 
not be used in determining salary increases. 
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(4) Board presidents and, to a lesser degree, superintendents felt that the 
superintendent's performance on the job description has an impact on salary 
increases. 
In the ideal or preferred manner of awarding superintendent salary increases, the 
following was found: 
(1) Increase or decrease of student population should have little effect on salary 
increases. 
(2) Board presidents felt that the superintendent's salary increase should be 
related to the teacher negotiated contract settlement, while superintendents 
felt that the superintendent's salary increase should be separate from the 
teacher negotiated settlement. 
(3) Board presidents felt that the performance on the job description should be 
heavily considered for salary increases. Superintendents placed a 
significantly lower level of importance than do board presidents for 
compensation increases based upon job performance. Both board presidents 
and superintendents agreed that standardized test scores should not be a 
factor. 
(4) A slight negative correlation was found when comparing the perceived quality 
rating of a school district with performance-based pay for the superintendent. 
This finding may bind some credibility to Deming's theory that performance 
or merit pay may have a negative influence on the organization. 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of paying school district personnel on the basis of their performance 
is not new to boards of education. For over sixty years, performance-based compensation 
plans have been alternately praised and condemned by school districts throughout the 
United States. In fact, some state legislatures have even funded pilot programs involving 
performance-based compensation for school personnel. Some school districts have also 
been involved in pertbrmance-based compensation programs in the past, with the advent 
of collective bargaining. Some districts have discontinued these programs. Still other 
districts currently use some form of merit incentive, while numerous districts are 
interested in studying this issue. The concept has been vigorously debated and written 
about under such descriptors as "merit pay," "career increments," "quality of 
pertbrmance pay," "career ladder," and "differential salaries," to name just a few. 
However, current data on the extent to which pertbrmance-based compensation and 
incentives have actually been negotiated in contracts with educational administrators 
have not been available (Educational Research Service, 1978; Kienapfel, 1984; Graves, 
1995). 
In 1983, the "Nation at Risk" report precipitated one of the most active periods of 
educational reform. The report charged that the "educational foundations of society are 
presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity." A groundswell of public and 
political energy and enthusiasm for improving education which has never been seen 
before had begun (Boyer, 1983; Business Higher Education Reform, 1983; Goodlad, 
1984; National Commission on Excellence in Education for Economic Growth, 1983; 
Ravitch, 1984; Sizer, 1984). 
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In 1984, a report entitled First in the Nation in Education addressed major issues 
and concerns about education, including accountability and leadership. It was in this 
report that superintendent performance was addressed as an important part of school 
improvement and reform. The report noted that strong and effective administrative 
leadership, beginning with the superintendent, is a critical factor in initiating change for 
school improvement (Iowa Legislative Council, 1984, p. 35). 
Evidence of legislative concern regarding superintendent performance can be 
found in actions by the Iowa Legislature (1985 Session of the 71st General Assembly) to 
strengthen certification. Study committees and the State Legislature have reinforced the 
important role that superintendents play related to school effectiveness. 
The public concern for educational excellence and demand for accountability 
have spotlighted the importance of quality leadership in our nation's schools. Research 
has shown that quality administrative leadership is the key factor in a school's 
educational effectiveness (Educational Research Service, 1993). Hence, effective 
procedures to evaluate and compensate administrative performance are of major concern 
to school officials, educational leaders, and concerned citizens (Educational Research 
Service). 
For half a century, performance-based compensation for teachers has been 
intensely debated in school systems of various sizes and in virtually every state in the 
nation (Educational Research Service, 1993). Performance-based compensation for 
school administrators, while not attracting the degree of controversy that has surrounded 
the issue of performance-based compensation for teachers, has been used in some 
schools as a step toward promoting increased accountability of school management. 
These programs have implemented performance-based compensation using a vast 
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number of different approaches and techniques, from management-by-objectives, to point 
and weighting systems for salary determination (Educational Research Service, 1993). 
Should performance-based compensation then be used as an incentive or reward 
for administrators to provide increased accountability for school management? W. 
Edwards Deming would emphatically disagree with this concept. 
W. Edwards Deming gave direction to business and other institutions. His focus 
on continuous improvement and quality transformed Japanese industry. Deming outlined 
his philosophy by listing fourteen points for managing quality and productivity. These 
points were designed primarily for the manufacturing sector but may apply to the 
education sector as well (Bosner, 1992). Deming not only outlines his fourteen points for 
success but also goes on to list "seven deadly diseases" which he says are elements in 
American institutions which lead to failure. One of these diseases is the "evaluation by 
performance, merit rating or annual review of performance." Deming states that "the 
effects of these are devastating-teamwork is destroyed; rivalry is nurtured. Performance 
ratings build fear, and leave people bitter, despondent, and beaten. They also encourage 
mobility of management" (Bosner, 1992). 
It is important to determine whether merit or performance-based compensation 
has any effect on the quality of the organization. Therefore, this study is concerned with 
superintendents' and school board presidents' perceptions of (1) how salary increases are 
awarded to superintendents, (2) preference for awarding salary increases, and (3) whether 
the manner of awarding salaries is related to the quality of the organization as so 
perceived by those involved in the organization. 
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Statement of the Problem 
Increasing the amount of pay for school personnel is often an annual event. 
Typically, teacher organizations in Iowa enter into collective bargaining with school 
districts to determine teachers' pay increases for the next school year. But what about 
school administrators? How do school districts determine the amount of salary increases 
for school administrators, especially for superintendents? To a great extent, the quality 
of America's school depends on the effectiveness of school superintendents. These 
executives of our nation's schools have complex leadership responsibilities and those 
who hold the position must be among the brightest and best our society has to offer. 
Their vision and performance must focus on creating schools that will inspire our 
children to become successful, caring Americans, capable of becoming contributing 
citizens of the world. 
The superintendency requires bold, creative, energetic, and visionary school 
leaders who can respond quickly to a myriad of issues ranging from dealing with social 
changes, diverse student populations, and demands for equity, to improving school 
quality for every child and making effective use of new technologies (Hoyle, 1993). 
With this in mind, pay decisions make a difference, but little is known about what kind or 
the value of the difference. 
The School Administrators of Iowa, a professional organization for administrators 
of Iowa schools, expressed two related issues of increasing concern (1) board/ 
administrator relationships and (2) the growing frustration on the part of management 
when it comes to dealing with salary and fringe benefit settlements (Tryon, 1992). Since 
1985, teachers' pay increases have grown at a much larger percentage rate than have 
administrators' pay increases. The association encourages boards of education to 
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compensate administrators with a percentage salary increase no less than what is given to 
teachers (Tryon, 1992). 
The problem to be addressed is whether superintendents and board presidents 
currently agree upon the factors that determine pay increases for superintendents. This 
then will be compared to the quality index of the school as so measured by the "School 
System Perceived Quality Assessment Instrument", developed at Iowa State University, 
(Poston & Bax, 1994), to see if the method of awarding salary increases is dependent 
upon the perceived quality of the school. 
Purpose 
The primary purposes of this study were: 
1. To determine the manner in which superintendents and board presidents 
perceive that the superintendents of selected Iowa school districts are awarded 
salary increases. 
2. To determine the methods of reward for superintendents that are preferred by 
Iowa school superintendents and board presidents. 
3. To determine the perceived quality index of selected school districts in the 
state of Iowa. 
4. To determine the relationship between the perceived quality index of Iowa 
school districts and the level and methods of compensation of Iowa 
superintendents. 
Research Questions 
1. What factors are used by boards in determining pay increases for the 
superintendent in the district? 
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2. To what degree is performance desired by boards in determining pay increases 
for the superintendent? 
3. To what degree are pay increases for superintendents actually based upon 
performance? 
4. How do levels of salary increases awarded to superintendents relate to the 
perceived quality of the district? 
5. How do methods of compensation differ in terms of corresponding levels of 
quality in the system? 
6. What differences are there between superintendents and school boards in 
preferences, beliefs, and actions relating to superintendent compensation? 
Hypotheses 
This study was an investigation into the perceptions of superintendents and board 
presidents as to the methods currently used in awarding superintendents salary increases, 
preference of these two groups for awarding superintendent salary increases, and the 
relationship of awarding salary increases with the perceived quality of the school district. 
The hypotheses to be tested were: 
1. There is no significant difference between board presidents and 
superintendents concerning their beliefs in how superintendents are 
currently being compensated and how they should be compensated. 
2. There is no significant difference in the beliefs of board presidents and 
superintendents in their choices concerning whether pay increases for 
superintendents should be based upon performance or non-performance 
criteria. 
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3. There are no significant differences between the perception of superintendents 
and board presidents concerning the current practice of awarding pay 
increases and the preferred manner in which pay increases should be awarded. 
4. No significant differences exist among superintendents of low, moderate, and 
high strength of belief in non-performance-based pay when compared by the 
ranking of their school district in the "ideal situation." 
5. There is no relationship between the superintendent's strength of belief in 
performance pay and the ranking of their school district in the Quality 
Review study. 
Significance of the Study 
This study investigates the perceptions of Iowa superintendents and board 
presidents about the factors that determine salary increases of Iowa superintendents 
including their attitudes toward use of performance for salary increases. Although much 
has been written, only a few studies have cast much light on the subject (Graves, 1995). 
A primary reason for the study was the glaring lack of information concerning the issue 
(Rist, 1985). 
Superintendents of public schools are considered to be the chief instructional 
leaders of the school district (Hoyle, 1993). It would seem plausible that school boards 
would wish to consider this role in determining how to reward superintendents. 




This study was based upon the assumption that subjects respond honestly to the 
surveys and that the perceptions of all respondents represent actual behaviors or actions 
measured. The study presumed that the respondents were truthful, honest, and correctly 
understood the directions and contents of the instrument. 
1. The School System Perceived Quality Assessment Instrument was valid and 
reliable for measuring the quality index of schools. 
2. The questionnaire used to determine the method of awarding superintendent 
salary increases was determined to be valid and reliable following a review 
by a panel of experts. 
3. Participants completing the surveys were knowledgeable. 
4. Respondents provided complete and accurate information. 
Delimitations of the Study 
This section of the study deals with those areas that may affect the research 
outcomes. Specific areas of limitation are noted with the possible affects each may have 
had on the conclusions of this study. 
(1) The sample was drawn entirely from Iowa. Therefore, the results of this study 
may not apply to other states or countries. 
(2) The list of determining factors for pay increases were developed from 
existing research and related literature. Given the minimal amount of 
research in this area, these factors are not necessarily a complete listing. 
(3) This study assessed the perceptions of Iowa superintendents and board 
presidents. Therefore, the results of this study may not accurately reflect 
perceptions of any other groups. 
9 
Definition of Terms 
Allowable Growth ~ increased money for district spending 
Controlled Budget - Uniform Levy ($5.40/thousand) plus State Foundation Aid plus 
additional levy plus property tax adjustment 
New Money — the increase in the school district's controlled budget from one year to 
the next 
Performance-based Compensation - increased salaries awarded for achieving 
predetermined measurable student or organizational outcomes or results 
Research Design and Variables of the Study 
This study included the use of two surveys. The first survey, "Current and 
Preferred Methods of Awarding Superintendent Salary Increases," asked superintendents 
and board presidents to answer questions as to how superintendents were currently 
awarded salary increases and preferences for awarding salary increases. In the design of 
the questionnaire, the first seven items elicit information about factors which may or may 
not have any relationship to superintendent performance. These include (1) length of 
service to the district, (2) increased formal education or inservice training, (3) cost of 
living increase, (4) new money awarded to the district or allowable growth, (5) teachers 
negotiated settlement, (6) salaries of superintendents in schools of similar size, and (7) 
increase or decrease in student population. 
Three items obtain information about performance including performance on 
superintendent's job description, achievement of district or long range goals, and school 
board evaluations of the superintendent. Two items seek to find if student performance 
or outcomes are considered in determining salary increases. Finally, the questionnaire 
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requested participants to rank in order the three most important factors used in 
determining salary increases. 
The second questionnaire, School System Perceived Quality Assessment 
Instrument, elicited information about seven characteristics of each school district. 
Based upon the Malcolm Baldridge Award, these characteristics include: leadership, 
information and analysis, strategic quality planning, human resource utilization, quality 
assurance of products and services, quality of results, and customer satisfaction. 
The prestigious Malcolm Baldridge Award was established in 1987 to encouraage 
quality improvement efforts among business and industry, and is now being considered 
for education. The Baldridge Award incorporates the use of self-assessment in 
determining a quality index or rating in each of the seven categories previously listed. 
According to Fargher (1991), "Self-assessment is a process of reviewing an 
organization's current practices, competitive strategies, policies, procedures, leadership, 
human resource practices, and employee and management attitudes toward customer 
focus, quality, and productivity" (p. 375). The Baldridge Award provides the best 
framework for a total quality management system and its criteria can be used to assess an 
organization's quality program (Brown, 1992; Jaehn, 1990; Knotts Jr., Parrish Jr., and 
Evans, 1993). 
Therefore, with the use of the School System Perceived Quality Assessment 
Instrument, a measurement of the perceived quality of the school district can be made. 
The procedure for the study was then be to see if there was a significant difference in the 
methods for awarding of salaries based upon performance or merit and levels of the 
perceived quality of the school system. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Superintendents are charged with the responsibility of being the chief 
instructional leader of a school district. It might then follow that pay increases for the 
superintendent would closely be tied to organizational performance or outcomes. 
However simple this may seem, there is not much evidence nationwide that pay is based 
on performance factors. The review of literature indicates that a common denominator 
for awarding pay increases seems to be lacking. 
This report deals with a traditional concern in organizations-how to devise a 
compensation plan for administrative personnel that is both supportive of organizational 
expectations and connected to individual satisfaction. This is a timely subject for 
analysis because; 
- Many school systems have no systematic compensation plan for administrators. 
- Some school systems have compensation plans that are inequitable. 
- Some school systems have compensation plans that are nonrational. 
- Some school systems have adopted schemes proposed by national and regional 
associations for compensating a particular segment of the total 
administrative staff, such as elementary-or secondary-school principals. 
- The increasing size of and changes in administrative units are creating 
pressures for system-wide compensation planning for all personnel. 
- Continued adherence to the assumption that administration and teaching are 
similar functions will inhibit development of new departures in 
compensation plans for administrators. 
- Collective negotiations units for professional school personnel frequently 
exclude administrators. 
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- Absence of objective arrangements for resolving compensation conflicts 
leads to organizational tensions, leadership failure, and personnel 
dissatisfaction. 
- Many school boards misunderstand the human impact of pay differentials. 
- Dissension continues as to the reference base for scheduling administrative 
salaries. 
- Differentiated pay plans for differentiated staffing, it is alleged, constitute a 
threat to the equity of salaries for administrative personnel. 
- Competitive salary pressures from lower echelons have resulted in less 
favorable treatment of personnel at the highest administrative levels. 
- Boards of education are becoming increasingly reluctant to establish for 
administrators the highly ingrained and traditional single salary schedule 
which is generally employed to compensate teachers (Castetter & Heisler, 
1974). 
According to Pitner and Ogawa in their study of the superintendent in 
organizational leadership, "in spite of the general tendency for superintendents to attend 
to structural matters, they find satisfaction in the success of individual students and 
teachers. Thus, in spite of little real influence on the basic activity of schools - the 
instruction of students - superintendents attribute responsibility to themselves for 
instructional outcome" (Pitner & Ogawa, 1981). 
A similar viewpoint was expressed by one superintendent in a justification for 
performance contracts (Allen, 1987). The superintendent stated that "many reports, as 
well as group spokespersons, are viewing management in terms of leadership teams 
concerned with the performance of people and the results of the organization." Terms 
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like "school-based" and "site-based" empowerment and teachers' leadership are relatively 
new concepts in educational literature. Regardless of this new organizational thrust it is 
believed that the impetus of school reform still lies with the superintendent and school 
board (Allen, 1987). 
Others support similar viewpoints. What the management team does, particularly 
the superintendent, determines how successful a school district is going to be. A school 
board can establish goals and policies, monitor performance, develop staff talent, and 
balance the budget. But unless the board sees to it that the superintendent and the 
management team implement the principal elements of educational management (people, 
process, and performance), the district has a slim chance of receiving the leaming results 
it seeks (Genck & Klingenberg, 1978). 
History of Performance-based Compensation 
Interest in performance-based compensation programs seems to be at its height 
whenever education comes under criticism. Generally though, the literature reflects that 
performance-based compensation has generally been thought of in relation to teachers 
rather than administrators. In reviewing the history of performance-based compensation, 
we find that attempts for monetarily rewarding teachers on a performance basis was 
conceived as early as 1908 in Newton, Massachusetts (Educational Research Service, 
1978). From then until the 1920's, the use of performance-based compensation for 
teachers grew steadily. Evidence was then found of performance-based compensation for 
teachers entered into the literature during the 1950's and again in the 1960's, when there 
was pressure for school improvement (Weissman, 1974). However, the literature was 
still lacking in referencing performance-based compensation for administrators. 
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The highly publicized A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform. 
which reflected the conclusion of the National Commission on Excellence in Education, 
prompted renewed interest in performance-based compensation for educators. However, 
the idea of rewarding people on the basis of how much or how well they produce has 
been around for a long time (Kienapfel, NASSP, 1984). 
Educators, however, have had difficulty in adapting this "reward on the basis of 
production" idea to education, even though there has been some desire to do just that. 
Attempts to measure educational productivity quickly ran into obstacles and criticism. 
That difficulty in measuring production and the resultant criticism and mistrust of 
salary systems based on such measuring have kept most school districts from putting any 
such "reward for production" or "reward for performance" or "merit pay" systems into 
effect. Most school districts settle for a salary system in which rewards are typically 
based on length of service and amount of formal education. The implication, of course, 
is that teachers and administrators get better as their years of experience increases, and/or 
as they acquire more college credit (Kniepfel, 1984). 
Reasons for Past Failures of Performance-based Compensation Systems 
In recent years there has been frequent debate regarding the desirability of 
performance-based compensation for school administrators. For numerous reasons there 
have been very few districts actually trying performance-based compensation and 
basically these programs were intended for school administrators other than 
superintendents. 
However, in 1977, the Board of Education of the Rialto Unified School District 
and the superintendent began to refine a "Management Evaluation and Development 
Program" (Ruttan, 1978). The purposes of this program were: (1) to judge performance 
15 
levels of managers; (2) to improve performance and/or maintain it at the highest possible 
level; (3) to encourage retention of effective managers; (4) to identify needs of managers 
and to provide assistance for those needs; and (5) to identify outstanding performance 
v^hich would result in merit pay (Ruttan, 1978). 
This program was designed to support the goal of providing students with the 
opportunity to acquire a quality education through improved evolution. It was also 
designed to be a positive continuing process that involves management in examining and 
discussing how each individual is performing (Ruttan, 1978). 
In looking at other performance-based compensation programs, it was felt that the 
reasons they had failed were that the plans had been concerned with performance-based 
compensation alone and had ignored the importance of the evaluation process and the 
necessity of an inservice training program. This in turn caused managers to resist 
performance-based compensation, since they were apprehensive that without an 
evaluation criteria, placement on the performance-based compensation salary schedule 
would be arbitrary and that, without an inservice program, there would be no opportunity 
for them to improve their specific skills (Ruttan, 1978). 
Administrator Opinions Concerning Performance-based Compensation 
As controversial as performance-based compensation is and has been, there are of 
course argimients on each side of the issue. It should be no surprise that school boards 
and superintendents are looking for alternatives in awarding salary increases. As Meitler 
explains, "the real problem isn't that administrative salaries are too high, it is the problem 
of the indiscriminate awarding of increases to administrators" (Meitler, 1974). Many 
board members and superintendents are fhistrated or alarmed as they annually encounter 
the same problems, as shown below. 
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1. Inequities have crept into the structure of salaries and are perpetuated; 
2. The lack of method for recognizing superior performance; 
3. The lack of a method for holding back the salary of individuals whose 
performance or already high salary doesn't merit a salaiy increase 
(Meitler, 1975). 
In listening to educators and school board members discuss performance-based 
compensation, we find both skeptics and supporters. Many board members support the 
idea of paying administrators on the basis of performance, but don't know how to do it. 
On the other hand, most administrators quietly resist the concept of performance-based 
compensation with the fond hope that the idea vwll go away (Meitler, 1975). 
Many opinions expressed about performance-based compensation appear to be 
based on hearsay and personal feelings rather than fact or experience. It's important to 
keep in mind that very few performance-based compensation programs exist in school 
districts and little has been written about them. Consequently, when most administrators 
react with skepticism to the concept, their reaction is based on what they have been told 
by the teacher associations (Meitler, 1975). 
Advantages of Performance-based Compensation 
The following reasons are usually given in support of performance-based 
compensation for administrators; 
School districts should reward superior performance. Performance-based 
compensation provides an opportunity to give additional financial recognition to 
individuals whose performance is considered to be superior. Of course, the converse is 
also true and small increases can be given to individuals who are not performing 
satisfactorily. 
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School boards should hold administrators accountable. There has been much talk 
about accountability and many programs and procedures attempt to deal with the issue of 
holding administrators accountable. However, accountability means little until it takes 
some tangible form. Giving smaller or larger salary increases is one of the most tangible 
ways of actually communicating the concept of accountability. 
School hoards should treat administrators as managers. School boards expect 
administrators to act as managers, but they usually treat them as teachers with respect to 
compensation and other personnel policies. If boards want administrators to function as 
managers, they should treat them as such and also compensate them on the same basis as 
managers are paid in other organizations. 
School districts should provide incentives to improve. If an opportunity exists to 
earn additional money, it is assumed that most administrators will respond by improving 
their performance. Of course, other responses may also occur. Administrators who 
receive small increases or no salary increase year after year may choose to leave the 
school district (Meitler, 1975). 
Disadvantages of Performance-based Compensation 
Several arguments have been presented against performance-based compensation. 
Some examples are as follows: 
Some administrators v^ill resist evaluation. While this is not true of all 
administrators, some fear the results of evaluation and will fight a merit compensation 
program. 
Unhealthy competition will be created udth the administrative team. This is one 
of the frequently advanced potential problems of a performance-based compensation 
program. However, based on experience in industrial programs, this is seldom a real 
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problem. One way of handling this potential problem is to make teamwork and 
cooperation one of the criteria used for granting performance-based compensation. 
A performance evaluation program must be developed. Performance evaluation 
in the field of education may never be very objective. Nevertheless, considerable time 
must be devoted to development of an acceptable means of evaluation performance if 
performance-based compensation is to be granted. 
More time and effort is required to administer a merit program. Using the 
teacher's salary schedule was very easy and required little time of administrators. There 
is no question that more time is required to establish criteria and evaluate performance 
under a performance-based compensation program (Meitler, 1975), 
Performance-based Compensation for Administrators: 
Rationale and Overview 
In business, industry, and commerce, performance and production of workers are 
to some degree the basis for determining salaries and promotions. Although many 
factors mitigate the degree to which this generalization is reality, the fact remains that it 
is in a company's best interest to reward the most productive employees with more 
compensation or more responsibility (Kienapfel, 1984). In contrast, the concept of 
reward on the basis of production has been difficult to adapt to education. Although 
some school districts have made serious efforts to implement a performance-based 
compensation plan for teachers or administrators, few have been successful. Efforts to 
measure educational productivity have typically run into numerous obstacles and 
criticisms. "Schools aren't businesses," critics charge, "they don't produce tangible 
products like cement, scissors, or computers." How can educators ~ administrators and 
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teachers alike - be held accountable for something as intangible as "student learning" 
(Kienapfel, 1984). 
The many difficulties involved in measuring job performance in education, 
combined with the criticisms and distrust of salary systems based on such measurements, 
have dissuaded most school districts from instituting performance-based compensation 
systems for either teachers or administrators. In an Educational Research Service (ERS) 
study, 11,502 school districts enrolling 300 or more pupils were surveyed to determine 
how many had merit or incentive pay plans for administrators and teachers. Among the 
2,848 responses, 435 (15.3 %) had a merit or incentive pay plan for administrators and 11 
(4.0%) had such a plan for teachers (Educational Research Service, 1978). In general, 
most districts content themselves with a salary scale based on the employee's length of 
service and level of education. Implicit in these systems is the assumption that teachers 
and school administrators improve in their jobs as their years of experience increase or as 
they acquire more college credits. 
Performance-based compensation offers an alternative to encourage 
administrators to give their best to their jobs. In the current climate of criticism of 
education, only the best performance may be sufficient. 
Importance of Performance-based Compensation for School Administrators 
The relationship between quality of performance and length of service or amount 
of education is weak at best. However, some school districts continue to use an 
experience/education salary schedule, and some do not use any kind of performance-
based compensation salary schedule. One reason is that experience and education are 
relatively easy to measure. Consequently, salary schedules based on them are easy to 
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administer. Performance-based compensation systems, on the other hand, are difficult to 
measure and administer (Kienapfel, 1984). 
Yet, despite the many problems, performance-based compensation for school 
administrators should be examined. It offers a coherent method for bringing 
administrative salaries into line with salaries in the private sector. School administrators 
are typically at the end of the line when salaries are being raised and they tend to receive 
"what is left." This problem is often compounded by the relationship between 
administrators and school board members. Board members, who usually know the 
administrators in their district on a more personal basis than they know other staff 
members, sometimes allow personalities to influence decisions of general salary 
increases. A 10 percent across-the-board increase for administrators may run into 
difficulty because each board member may know some administrators who, in the 
member's opinion, do not deserve a 10 percent raise. Therefore, a whole administrative 
staff may suffer because of board members' opinions, accurate or inaccurate, concerning 
the performance of a few (Kienapfel, 1984). 
Boards of education might be more v^rilling to grant a given average salary 
increase for administrators if they could be sure that superior administrators actually 
would receive greater percent increase and below-average performing administrators 
would receive a lesser increase. An opportunity for school administrators to be paid 
according to performance is one way for the best school administrators to keep pace with 
other school staff increases. This concept is predicated on the assumption that it is 
possible to differentiate accurately between superior and below-average administrators 
(Kienapfel, 1984). 
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Reasons for Evaluating Superintendents 
Evaluating a superintendent's performance is "one of the most important and 
difficult challenges facing school boards today" (Redfem, 1984). Redfciiti diunmarizes 
the important reasons: 
Evaluation plays many roles. It is motivational. It is an aid in planning. It is 
developmental. It aids in communication. And ultimately, effective evaluation 
helps to assure a good education for students in our nation's schools 
(Redfem, 1984). 
Improving educational performance is the basic reason for a school board to 
systematically evaluate the superintendent. Because of the superintendent's unique 
position as chief executive officer, he or she affects the school district's overall 
performance (Genck, 1983). How well superintendents perform their duties has a direct 
impact on teacher performance, which in turn affects student achievement. Systematic 
evaluations can help superintendents maintain an awareness of the interconnections and 
prevent them from becoming detached from the education for which they are responsible 
(Genck, 1983). 
When a school board evaluates its superintendent, it also creates opportunities to 
improve its own effectiveness. Evaluating the superintendent compels the board to 
understand the superintendent's management role and responsibilities, thus more clearly 
defining its own policymaking role. The process of setting goals and standards for the 
superintendent also assists the board in setting district goals and objective views, and in 
planning to better meet the educational needs of the district's students (Haughland, 
1987). 
School district goals and priorities often change from year to year. Nemir points 
out that when district priorities change, a shift of emphasis in the superintendent's 
professional and management responsibilities occurs. Performance evaluation is an ideal 
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setting for the board and the superintendents to identify and ratify these changes in the 
latter's responsibilities (Nemir, 1988). 
Another reason for the school board to systematically evaluate the superintendent 
includes: providing accountability; informing the superintendent of the board's 
expectations; and demonstration to district staff that administrators are being held 
accountable for the performance of the staff they supervise (McDaniel, 1986). 
Performance-based Compensation and Evaluation/Performance 
Moving beyond the discussion of superintendents/job activities, one finds that the 
question of superintendent's performance, i.e., behaviors evaluated "effective" or 
"ineffective" in terms of district goals, remains significant even in districts where 
consensus has been reached regarding expectations and perception of the job. 
According to Salley, there is "widespread dissatisfaction with 
superintendents' evaluation and performance appraisal programs by both 
superintendents and boards. Neither group employs objective and 
systematic procedures and processes to evaluate the effectiveness of 
superintendents' performance. This regrettable condition - given the 
obligation of both superintendents and board to provide for the best 
educational experiences and programs for students through effective 
administration - is due to the combination of the inability and unwillingness 
of school boards and superintendents to anchor their evaluation and 
performance appraisal systems in objective knowledge and sound 
procedures" fSalley, 1980). 
Relating Salaries to Learner Outcomes 
There is much public support for correlating salaries and salary increases to the 
performance or outcomes of students. Again the dilemma involved in this is what to use 
as measureable criteria. 
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Historically, parents established schools to assume learner outcomes for their 
children because they either felt they were too busy or they lacked the skill themselves. 
Thus, the sole legitimate reason for schools is to produce learning outcomes (Benedict & 
Gerardi, 1985). 
However, the public school system in the United States has traditionally been 
process based. Schools have usually been rated on the inputs which have been placed in 
school systems rather than organizational outcomes. Schools have been judged good or 
inadequate depending on such attributes as classroom models being used, fiscal 
responsibility, student discipline, etc. 
The current public and political discontent with the educational system, however, 
is changing the ground rules. Public attention has become more and more focused on 
quality of schooling, and demands for instructional improvement can be heard 
everywhere. The U.S. Commission on Excellence in Education Report is a recent case in 
point. This accountability trend points toward supervision and evaluation based on 
learner outcomes, rather than unrelated and conflicting subjective material of the past 
(Benedict & Gerardi, 1985). 
If the premise is accepted that good and not so good schools are judged on the 
basis of learner outcomes, then the next problem encountered is how to define learner 
outcomes. Are learner outcomes those measured by teachers over the material which is 
presented to students (criterion referenced), or are learner outcomes those that measure 
student achievement in comparison to other students in the state or nation (norm 
referenced)? 
Arguments for criterion referenced testing indicate better validity because of 
students being tested over the actual material presented to students. Those opposed 
explain that students cannot be isolated from district to district, nor from state to state. 
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and that standards in one school system may be much less than other systems (Benedict 
& Gerardi, 1985). 
Arguments for norm-referenced, or standardized testing, say that standardized 
tests provide a reliable and valid indicator of school outcomes, particularly in the areas of 
reading comprehension and mathematics computation. Also standardized tests seem to 
be publicly well accepted and tend to provide a measure of educational effectiveness 
(Benedict & Gerardi, 1985). 
Finally, schools that achieve above expectations on standardized tests also tend to 
succeed in other important areas such as attendance, student self-concept and 
participation, lack of student disruption and vandalism, and low incidence of delinquent 
behavior in the community (Benedict & Gerardi, 1985). 
With this in mind, proponents of using standardized testing scores as a valid 
measure of learned outcomes often feel that this could be a way of awarding 
performance-based compensation increases for all educators (Benedict & Gerardi, 1985). 
Advent of Quality 
A growing number of voices now call for reform of K-12 schools. Not 
suprisingly, a majority of the voices making the call and offering direction are outside of 
education. Maybe that is to be expected because new paradigms do not come from 
within but rather from areas external to the field being challenged (Barker, 1991). While 
recognizing that considerable uncertainty prevails in the field of education, one certainty 
remains ~ the call for school renewal will continue and intensify. 
Numerous national reports find fault with the quality of education in the United 
States, and there is general agreement among observers, analysts, and participants in the 
system that criticism is warranted (Boyer, 1983; Business - Higher Education Forum, 
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1983; Gardner, 1971; Goodlad, 1984; Lightfoot, 1983; National Commission in 
Education, 1983; National Task Force on Education for Economic Growth, 1983; 
Ravitch, 1984; Sizer, 1984; Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Federal Elementary 
and Secondary Education Policy, 1983). The reports tend to concentrate more on 
identifying problems than on how to solve them (Smith, 1984). In addition, there is little, 
if any, consensus about how to improve the system in the field that produces the 
managers of change in education, namely educational administration (Griffith, 1983; 
Hoy, 1982). 
As a major contributor of tax dollars to public education, corporate America is 
getting a lousy return on its investment. Business states that: 
Schools today are not preparing kids for jobs - they aren't even teaching them 
to read and write. In the United States, thirty percent of all high school students 
(one million teenagers each year) drop out before graduating. Most are virtually 
unemployable. And of those who do graduate, many do not have the problem-
solving skills necessary to function in an increasingly complex information 
society (Moen, 1988, p. 24). 
Continual Quality Improvement, the Deming Philosophy 
W. Edwards Deming is best known for his work in Japan following World War II 
that gives him credit for designing that nation's postwar economy recovery. His ideas 
about management grew from his teaching, research, and professional practices in the 
United States, where he became a pioneer in the development of statistical sampling 
techniques and quality control in industry. He later developed an overall philosophy of 
management and a set of processes through which to implement his philosophy 
(Stampen, 1991). 
Deming's approach to quality improvement in industry is described in Out of the 
Crisis (19861 in an accompanying set of videotapes, "Quality, Productivity, and 
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Competitive Position" (1985), and in a series of seminars, many of which were held at 
leading universities. 
Brief History of Continual Quality Improvement 
Historically, the quality improvement philosophy seems to be evidenced as early 
as the 1800's when the Zeiss Company, known for its optical products, collaborated with 
workers about what work needs to be accomplished, while letting the employees 
themselves determine how the work was to be completed (Drucker, 1974). In later years, 
around the 1940's, the basic notion of worker participation seemed to be growing here in 
the United States. A prominent example of this was Walt Disney, who would solicit 
information and suggestions from employees and their wives and children to determine 
how the Disney Company could be improved (Ingle, 1982). Also, in the 1940's, IBM 
become famous for using group problem-solving techniques. Engineers, foremen, and 
workers cooperatively worked out details, resulting in a superior design which was 
significantly better, cheaper, and faster (Ingle, 1982). Other examples of the utilization 
of continuous improvement principles could be seen in Bell Laboratories (Pines, 1990; 
Port, 1991; Gail, 1991; Gabor, 1990), and finally, the Army in the 1930's, who was 
teaching statistical methods to those supplying armaments to the military (Pines, 1990; 
Port, 1991; Psihoyos, 1991; Perine, 1990). 
Continual Quality Improvement 
Deming described his philosophy mostly through the aid of case examples and 
short essays which illustrate criteria for effective management. In his view, they 
collectively constitute an operational theory of management (Stampen, 1991). 
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The contemporary perception of American business and industry is that the U.S. 
firms have been playing catch-up in the areas of quality and productivity. Evidence of 
this can be seen where foreign competition has entered markets once dominated by U.S. 
companies by producing higher quality products (Aly & Maytubby & Elshennany, 1990; 
Burstein & Sedlak, 1988; Wilkinson & Allen & Snape, 1991; Horton, 1989). However, 
the U.S. seems to have been lacking in quality and improvement programs and the lack 
of quality management. 
Continual quality improvement seems to embrace a whole new philosophy of 
production which seems foreign to current U.S. practices and include: 
1. Achievement of higher levels of quality and increasing productivity; 
2. A long-term and continuous process with managers promoting 
continuous improvement, beginning with their own functions; 
3. Statistical process control; 
4. Incorporation of quality and integrity into every level of an organization; 
5. A refocus of its priorities on customers and produce superior quality 
products and service; 
6. Continuous improvement in customer satisfaction by allowing the 
customer to define quality (Cook, 1991; Deming, 1986; Horton, 1989; 
Day, 1991; Crosby, 1991; Wilkinson & Allen &, Snape, 1991; Juran, 
1980). 
Deming's Fourteen Points and the Relationship to Education 
W. Edwards Deming stresses fourteen points which must be included in a system 
which is to achieve quality. These fourteen points will be enumerated and then shown 
how the point is applicable to education. 
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Establish constancy of purpose 
Deming's first point is to create constancy of purpose toward the improvement of 
products and services by allocating resources for long-term planning, organizational 
research and education of the workforce (Deming, 1986). 
For educators, this means that all resources must be directed toward student 
development. All factions of the community including students, parents, teachers, 
support staff, administrators, school board members, and community patrons must all 
be involved in the functioning of the school, including short- and long-range planning 
(McLeod, 1991; Tribus, 1991; Melvin, 1991; Glaub, 1990; Leonard, 1991). 
Adopt a new philosophy 
Deming's second point is to reject commonly accepted levels of delays, mistakes, 
defective materials, and defective workmanship. Organizations must constantly perfect 
processes aimed at finding problems, their causes, and ways of correcting them (Deming, 
1986). 
All educators must believe that students are able to achieve at high levels under 
the right conditions of teaching and learning (McLeod, 1991; Tribus, 1991; Melvin, 
1991; Glaub, 1990; Leonard, 1991). 
Cease dependence on mass inspection 
Deming's third point is to cease mass inspection of purchased materials and 
services. Instead, improve selection processes and seek statistical evidence of quality 
(Deming, 1986). 
Testing and measurement must be used often to determine outcomes or progress 
of students (McLeod, 1991; Tribus, 1991; Melvin, 1991; Glaub, 1990; Leonard, 1991). 
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End the practice of awarding business on the basis of price alone 
Deming's fourth point advocates ending the practice of awarding business on the 
basis of price tag. Strive for the long-term reduction of total cost rather than piecemeal 
efficiency (Deming, 1986). 
End the practice of awarding business on the basis of price alone. Educators must 
be more concerned with quality rather than in just low cost. All facets of the educational 
program must be evaluated to determine outcomes (McLeod, 1991; Tribus, 1991; 
Melvin, 1991; Glaub, 1990; Leonard, 1991). 
Constantly improve every system 
Deming's fifth point advocates looking for problems in the system. Managers, 
and no one else, are responsible for finding and correcting systematic problems (Deming, 
1986). 
Educators need to constantly improve and upgrade school programs and services. 
Barriers which are identified must be eliminated so that progress can be made (McLeod, 
1991; Tribus, 1991; Melvin, 1991; Glaub, 1990; Leonard, 1991). 
Institute training on the job 
Deming's sixth point supports instituting modem methods of training on the job. 
Employees cannot perform well unless they know their jobs and feel free to inform 
managers of problems they encounter. Also, statistical methods must be used to identify 
when on-the-job training has achieved its purpose (Deming, 1986). 
Employees and managers must work together to solve problems. Employees and 
managers must have constant access to new methods and developments to stay abreast of 
the changing demands and requirements. Statistical analysis should always be used to 
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identify needed training (McLeod, 1991; Tribus, 1991; Melvin, 1991; Glaub, 1990; 
Leonard, 1991). 
Institute leadership 
Deming's seventh point advocates instituting modem methods of supervision. 
Supervision is one of the most important responsibilities of managers. They must learn 
from employees to help them do a better job (Deming, 1986). Deming (1989) says that 
managers or supervisors must become leaders and that an effective leader: (1) must 
understand the meaning of a system and how the work of groups supports the system, (2) 
sees the group as a function of the system, (3) understands that all people are different 
and try to optimize the education, skills, and abilities of everyone, and help everyone to 
improve, (4) is a coach and counselor, not a judge, (5) will study results with the aim to 
continuous improvement, (6) wall know when someone is in need of special help, (7) 
creates an environment conducive to trust, freedom, and innovation, (8) does not expect 
perfection; people can learn from mistakes, (9) listens and learns without passing 
judgements, (10) understands the benefits of cooperation (Deming, 1986). 
Supervision is one of the most important responsibilities of managers. However, 
managers must become effective leaders who understand the system, know how to work 
with people, create a trusting environment, act as coach, listens, and understands 
cooperation (McLeod, 1991; Tribus, 1991; Melvin, 1991; Glaub, 1990; Leonard, 1991). 
Drive out fear 
Deming's eighth point is to drive out fear so that everyone can work effectively. 
Employees must hold secure jobs and feel free to express ideas, ask 
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questions, and ask for instructions. The elimination of fear is an important responsibility 
of managers (Deming, 1986). 
Employees must feel job security, feel freedom from fear, and feel free to express 
ideas (McLeod, 1991; Tribus, 1991; Melvin, 1991; Glaub, 1990; Leonard, 1991). 
Break down barriers between departments 
Deming's ninth point advocates breaking down barriers between departments. 
Teams composed of people performing different functions can work effectively to 
improve products and services (Deming, 1986). 
People in the various departments need to work cooperatively by solving 
problems through combining efforts and teamwork (McLeod, 1991; Tribus, 1991; 
Melvin, 1991; Glaub, 1990; Leonard, 1991). 
Abandon slogans 
Deming's tenth point recommends the elimination of goals, quotas, posters, and 
slogans asking for new levels of productivity without providing effective methods. Goals 
with "road maps are useless" (Deming, 1986). 
Managers must eliminate slogans, exhortations, and targets for teachers and 
students because they only create adversarial relationships (McLeod, 1991; Tribus, 1991; 
Melvin, 1991; Glaub, 1990; Leonard, 1991). 
Eliminate numerical goals and quotas 
Deming's eleventh point is to eliminate work standards that describe numerical 
quotas. Such standards, according to Deming, are "fortresses" against the improvement 
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of quality and productivity, and they manifest an inability to understand and provide 
appropriate supervision (Deming, 1986). 
Goals should be replaced with charts that measure progress and analyze the 
situation (McLeod, 1991; Tribus, 1991; Melvin, 1991; Glaub, 1990; Leonard, 1991). 
Remove barriers that rob people of pride in workmanship 
Deming's twelveth point recommends the removal of barriers to employee's rights 
to pride of workmanship. Pride of workmanship is impossible without accurate 
definitions of acceptable workmanship. Definitions are the responsibilities of managers 
(Deming, 1986). 
This point, and the focus of this study, explores whether performance-based 
ratings and pay are detrimental to quality and to the quality of the organization. "Merit 
ratings and pay rob the students, teachers, management and support staff of their right to 
pride and joy of workmanship (McLeod, 1991; Tribus, 1991; Melvin, 1991; Glaub, 
1990; Leonard, 1991). 
Promote education and self-improvement 
Deming's thirteenth point is to institute a vigorous program of education and 
retraining. Improvement in productivity means reassignment of personnel. Education 
and retraining will prepare people for new jobs and responsibilities. It is also necessary 
for everyone to learn the rudiments of statistical theory and application. The latter is a 
language of communication for organizational improvement (Deming, 1986). 
Schools must provide all employees with training in quality leadership, 
measurement, analysis, problem solving, self evaluation and assertiveness training. This 
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training must be part of their normal work of the school (McLeod, 1991; Tribus, 1991; 
Melvin, 1991; Glaub, 1990; Leonard, 1991). 
Structure management to accomplish the transformation 
Deming's fourteenth point is to create a structure in top management that will 
encourage implementation of the above thirteen points every day (Deming, 1986). 
Everyone in the system including superintendents, central office personnel, 
principals, teachers, support staff", students, parents, and community patrons are 
responsible for helping to bring about this transformation (McLeod, 1991; Tribus, 1991; 
Melvin, 1991; Glaub, 1990; Leonard, 1991). 
Applicability to Schools 
The American Association of School Administrators (A.A.S.A.) enlisted the 
expertise of quality management expert W. Edwards Deming to offer school leaders a 
new lens through which to view the transformation of schools that the president and 
governors are calling for by the year 2000 (Marx, 1991). 
Among Deming's principles, which he promoted in a conversation with A.A.S.A. 
staffs are; 
1. That education can only be transformed one system at a time; 
2. That leaders must have a vision and must understand their system in order to 
put that vision into practice; 
3. That schools must expect and design for variation among children; and 
4. That the goal of education leaders should not be achieving numerical goals, 
but transforming school systems (Marx, 1991). 
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Educators who apply Deming's quality concepts to schools are demonstrating that 
any form of effective decision-making closer to the "product" requires a different kind of 
support or leadership. 
The Malcolm Baldridge Award 
Quality management is different fi-om other programs in that it involves all 
employees and constitutes a fundamental change in the way an organization is measured 
and managed (Aly, Maytubby & Elshennawy, 1990; Wilkinson & Allen & Snape, 1991; 
Day, 1992). In 1987, the institution of the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award 
provided a nationally accepted set of criteria for evaluating the extent to which a 
company had implemented quality management. The key principles of the award 
include: (1) leadership, (2) information and analysis, (3) strategic quality planning, (4) 
human resource use, (5) quality assurance of products and services, (6) quality results, 
and (7) customer satisfaction. (Finley, 1991; Rohan, 1989; Edowsomwan & Savage-
Moore, 1991; McDonnell, 1988; Baatz, 1991; Spiker, 1991; Kiely, 1991; Brown, 1991). 
These themes were used to develop the questionaire about quality used in this study. 
The Baldridge Award provides the best framework for a quality improvement 
system. Its criteria can be used to assess an organization's quality program (Brown, 1992; 
Jaehn, 1990; Knotts Jr., Parrish Jr., and Evans, 1993). Currently, some companies are 
adopting its criteria to assess their processes and have applied for the award primarily to 
get an evaluation of their quality systems (Placek, 1992). 
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Summary 
There is no doubt that after reviewing the literature about performance pay and 
quality improvement that there is disagreement as to the impact or relationship between 
the two. On the one hand, proponents of performance-based compensation believe that 
school administrators and even teachers should be paid only upon the evidence that the 
organization is performing at a higher level. These proponents believe that 
administrators should be compensated on the performance of the job which has been 
assigned to them. 
Deming's quality improvement philosophy seemed to contradict performance-
based compensation. Deming believed that performance-based compensation was 
harmful to businesses, industries, and yes, our school systems. He believed that 
performance-based compensation "judges people, puts them in slots, and ruins them." 
A review of the literature indicates there is strong support for compensating the 
superintendent based upon evaluations, district goal achievements, and student outcomes. 
This comes at a time when education is coming under harsh criticism. On the other 
hand, W. Edwards Deming is very critical of any kind of merit- or performance-based 
compensation. His theories state that this is one factor which will destroy an 
organization. Therefore, there is a definite need to study the perceptions of perfomance-
based compensation as so indicated by those involved in the educational process and the 
relationship to the perceived quality of the educational organization. 
This study will continue by determining whether superintendents and board 
presidents believe in performance-based compensation, and then will compare these 
beliefs with the perceived quality rating of their particular school system. 
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
This study was designed to investigate and analyze perceptions of the manner in 
which superintendents are awarded salary increases. More specifically, the purpose of 
this study was: 
1. To determine tiie manner in which superintendents and board presidents 
perceive that the superintendents of selected Iowa school districts are 
currently awarded salary increases. 
2. To determine the manner in which superintendents and board presidents 
perceive that the superintendent of schools ideally should be awarded salary 
increases. 
3. To determine the perceived quality index of school districts in the state of 
Iowa, using the School System Perceived Quality Assessment Instrument, 
developed by William. K. Poston and Rashid Bax, Iowa State University. 
4. To determine the relationship between the perceived quality index of Iowa 
school districts and the compensation perceptions of Iowa superintendents. 
Development of Instrument 
"Current and Preferred Methods of Awarding Superintendent Salary Increases" 
The survey instrument utilized in this survey was developed to provide insights 
into perceptions at the local school district level concerning how superintendents are 
reimbursed. The instrument was developed following a review of related literature. 
Literature and information available concerning this particular topic was limited. 
Ten practicing superintendents and twelve board members were interviewed to 
determine what criteria were being used in determining the compensation of the 
superintendent. From the literature and the interviews, a proposed survey instrument was 
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developed. The items used in the survey were developed from a list of twelve criteria, 
either currently utilized to compensate superintendents, or criteria identified by 
practitioners that ideally should be used to compensate superintendents. The list of 
criteria was then categorized as either performance-based or non-performance-based in 
nature. For the purposes of this study, performance-based compensation was defined as 
compensation for the superintendent of schools that is related to indicators in the school 
system that can be measureably and specifically attributed to efforts by the 
superintendent. Non-performance-based compensation is compensation based upon 
those indicators measured in a school system over which a superintendent has little or no 
control. Seven of the twelve criteria developed were non-performance-based in nature, 
while five were indicators considered to be performance-based in nature. The twelve 
criteria were then developed into an instrument that could be utilized to measure the 
perceived relative importance of each criterion in determining the compensation of the 
school superintendent. 
The twelve criteria were then developed into twelve statements containing the 
phrase"... should be related to..and designed to elicit preferences for ideal criteria 
to utilize in determining the compensation of the superintendent. 
A five-point Likert scale was then attached to each of the twelve criteria that 
measured perception of how superintendents were being compensated and to the twelve 
criteria measuring ideal practices for superintendent compensation. On the Likert scale, 
a rating of one was given to a belief statement with which the respondent strongly 
disagreed and a rating of five for an indication of strong agreement. 
The survey instrument was evaluated by a validation panel of nine practicing 
administrators and researchers. (A list of the panel members can be found in Appendix 
A.) Five were practicing Iowa superintendents and others reviewing the questionnaire 
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included an assistant superintendent, a retired superintendent, a superintendent in Illinois, 
and a professor of Research and Evaluation at Iowa State University. All panel members 
indicated that the survey instrument was clear and would serve the purpose for which it 
was developed. 
The survey instrument was field tested with twelve board members who were 
serving on boards of education or had recently served on school boards. All twelve 
subjects indicated that the survey instrument was clear and would adequately serve the 
purpose for which it was developed. 
Based upon the response of the validation panel and others the instrument was 
deemed valid for the purposes for which it was developed (Fowler, p. 97). 
School System Perceived Quality Assessment Instrument 
The School System Perceived Quality Assessment Instrument was developed by 
William Poston and Rashid Bax, Iowa State University, to assess levels of quality in 
schools based on Baldrige-type criteria. There are questions, organized in seven groups 
which ask the respondent to rate the current conditions of the school and the desired 
condition. A panel of experts in quality improvement was selected to validate the 
instrument (See Appendix). Both questionnaires used the Likert type scale since Likert 
type scales are probably the most common types of attitude scales. (Borg & Gall, 1989). 
It is also recommended that any survey instrument be pretested in order to collect 
reliability and validity evidence. Both questionnaires were approved by the human 
subjects committee at Iowa State University (See Appendix). 
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Selection of Subjects 
The superintendents and board presidents of forty-four selected K-12 Iowa school 
districts were asked to respond to the questionnaire concerning salary increases for 
superintendents. Eleven currently practicing superintendents or curriculum directors 
elected four school districts in the state of Iowa to participate in this study. These 
districts ranged in size from 250 to 3,000+ students. All but ten superintendents and 
fourteen board presidents responded within the first ten days. Follow-up letters and 
questionnaires were sent to those who had not responded. Within two weeks, all but two 
board presidents had responded. A follow-up telephone call was made to each board 
president. Finally all 44 superintendents and 44 board presidents responded to the 
questionnaire. 
Five randomly selected teachers, all school board members, two administrators, 
three randomly selected support personnel, two randomly selected student body officers, 
and the superintendent from each of the 44 school districts were asked to complete the 
Perceived Quality Assessment Instrument. Follow-up to those districts not responding 
was done by the research group. 
Responses to the Perceived Quality Assessment Instrument were compiled. Of 
the 18-20 respondents (some districts have seven board members) from the forty-four 
K-12 school districts, all but four schools had enough returns to do a valid study. 
Variables Elicited 
The purpose of this study was to investigate and analyze perceptions of 
superintendents and school board presidents to determine the manner in which the 
district superintendent is currently and should be compensated. The variables utilized in 
this study included perceptions of superintendents and board presidents concerning 
40 
current practices relative to non-performance based pay and performance based pay for 
the superintendent; and to measure the perceived preferences of both groups coneming 
how superintendents ideally should be compensated. Descriptive statistics are presented 
for responses on the survey instrument. 
The dependent variable in this study is the cumulative result of the responses in 
terms of the perceived quality index of the selected school districts, using the School 
System Perceived Quality Assessment Instrument. This variable was used to test 
hypotheses four and five. 
Analysis of the Data 
Data from the surveys were tabulated and analyzed. Independent variables 
measured in this study were; 
1. Board presidents' perceptions of how superintendent compensation is 
currently determined. 
2. Board presidents' perceptions of how superintendent compensation ideally 
should be determined. 
3. Superintendents' perceptions of how superintendent compensation is currently 
determined. 
4. Superintendents' perceptions of how superintendent compensation ideally 
should be determined. 
Dependent variables measured in this study were: 
1. The positions of the individual taking part in the study, i.e. board president 
and superintendent. 
2. The quality index measure of the various school districts represented by the 
board presidents and superintendents in this study. 
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Several research questions were formulated to guide the study. 
1. Does the perception concerning how superintendents are compensated reflect 
the position that an individual holds, i.e., board president or superintendent? 
2. Does the perception concerning how superintendents should ideally be 
compensated reflect the position that an individual holds, i.e., board president 
or superintendent? 
3. Are there any significant relationships between the measured perceived 
quality of the school systems in this study and the beliefs of superintendents 
concerning how superintendents ideally should be compensated? 
4. Do differences exist between board presidents' perceptions of how 
superintendents are currently compensated and beliefs concerning how 
superintendents ideally should be compensated? 
5. Do differences exist between superintendents' perceptions of how 
superintendents are currently compensated and beliefs concerning how 
superintendents ideally should be compensated? 
Hypothesis one through three, testing for significant differences, were tested 
utilizing two-directional t-tests. Hypothesis four was tested utilizing one way analysis of 
various techniques. Hypothesis five was tested utilizing correlation. 
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CHAPTER rv. FINDINGS 
The purpose of this study was to ascertain superintendents' and board of education 
presidents' perceptions concerning conditions and criteria used in compensating district 
superintendents. The methodology utilized in this study involved assessing two aspects 
of compensation - perceptions and preferences. The first portion was a measurement of 
superintendent and board president perceptions on current practices of how 
compensation was determined. The second area measured preferences of both groups 
concerning how superintendents should be compensated. Results of these assessments 
are presented in this chapter. Descriptive statistics are presented for responses on the 
survey instrument. Three hypotheses concerning various groupings of superintendents 
and board presidents were tested with unpaired, two-tailed t-tests. A fourth hypothesis 
concerning group means was tested using one-factor analysis of variance. A fifth 
hypothesis concerning relationships of group perceptions was tested using the Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient test. 
Topics covered in this chapter are Internal Consistency Reliability, Descriptive 
Statistical Results, and Inferential Statistical Results. 
Internal Consistency Reliability 
The Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficient was calculated to determine an 
estimate of the internal consistency of the survey instrument. Reliability coefficients 
were calculated for the two sets of questions measuring current practices for 
compensating superintendents and also the two sets of questions measuring ideal criteria 
for compensating superintendents. 
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Estimates of internal consistency reliability are based on correlations among 
items and groups of items within the instrument. Table 1 contains the reliability 
coefficients for the four subtests of survey statements as well as the reliability coefficient 
for the total survey instrument. 
Table 1. Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients for subscales of four subjective 
variables 
Variables Alpha No. of items 
Current Practice 
1. Non-performance-based compensation items .75 7 
2. Performance-based compensation items .83 5 
Preferred Practice 
3. Non-performance-based compensation items .87 7 
4. Performance-based compensation items .67 5 
Total survey of four subtests .67 24 
Guidelines utilized for acceptance of Alpha limits were suggested by Nunnally 
and Durham (1975). 
In the early stages of research on predictor tests or hypothesized measures 
of a construct, one saves time and energy by working with instruments that 
have only modest reliability, for which purpose reliabilities of .60 or .50 will 
suffice ... for basic research, it can be argued that increasing reliabilities 
beyond .80 is often wasteful, (p. 345) 
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Although the reliability estimates were considered modest by most research 
standards, the fact that there are no similar surveys available for comparison purposes, 
led to an acceptance of this level of reliability for the first study of this nature. 
Descriptive Statistical Results 
In the first procedure, individual item and total subtest means and standard 
deviations were calculated for the aggregate of responses for all statements measuring 
superintendent and board president perceptions. Respondents were asked to assess the 
degree to which they agreed or disagreed using a five-point, Likert type scale. A rating of 
one was given to a belief statement with which the respondent strongly disagreed. A 
rating of two was given to a belief statement with which the respondent disagreed. A 
rating of three indicated that the respondent had no opinion on the survey item. A rating 
of four was given to a belief statement with which the respondent agreed. A rating of 
five was given to a belief statement with which the respondent strongly agreed. 
When summarizing the findings for each survey item and responses by the various 
groups, it is important to discuss the degree of agreement indicated by each mean 
response. For the purposes of this discussion, mean scores less than 2.25 are defined as a 
"low" level of support for the variable measured. Mean scores ranging fi-om 2.25 to 3.75 
are defined as indicating a "moderate" level of support for the variable measured and 
scores from 3.76 to 5 are defined as a "high" level of support for the variable measured. 
These designations were arbitrarily selected for purposes of comparison. 
Results presented in Table 2 represent superintendent and board president 
perceptions of how increases in compensation for the superintendent are awarded in 
current practice and how they should be awarded in ideal practice. 
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Table 2. Total means and standard deviations of aggregate responses of superintendents 
and board presidents concerning practices and preferences for salary increases 
for the superintendent. 
Presidents Superintendents 
Item Belief Statement N X (SD) N X (SD) 
Part "A" Perceptions of "How salaries are currently awarded." 
Statements 1-7. Statements not related to performance in pay determinations. 
1. Length of service to district 44 2.67 (.94) 44 2.68 (.93) 
2. Increased formal education 44 2.75 (.97) 44 2.27 (.95) 
3. Cost of living 44 2.86 (1.00) 44 2.48 (1.09) 
4. Growth in district revenues 44 3.46 (1.15) 44 3.50 (1.07) 
5. Teacher contract settlement 43 3.56 (1.22) 44 3.80 (1.17) 
6. Salaries of colleagues in region 44 3.39 (.99) 44 3.48 (1.07) 
7. Chanee in student oonulation numbers 44 1.86 fl 02^ 44 2.16 n.i6^ 
Totals 44 2.94 (1.17) 44 2.91 (1.22) 
Statements 8-12. Statements related to performance in pay determinations. 
8. Superintendents performance on job 
performance 44 3.96 (1.16) 44 3.73 (.85) 
9. Achievement of district goals 44 3.61 (1.13) 44 3.11 (.99) 
10. School board evaluation 44 3.77 (1.05) 44 3.61 (.99) 
11. Student achievement (outcomes) 44 2.77 (1.14) 44 2.02 (1.02) 
12. Standardized test score results 44 2.05 n . i2^  44 1.73 f.90) 
Totals 44 3.23 (1.32) 44 2.84 (1.25) 
Part "B" Preferences concerning "How salaries should be awarded." 
Statements 1-7. Statements favoring non-performance based pay. 
1. Length of service to district 44 2.55 (1.02) 44 2.97 (1.05) 
2. Increased formal education 44 3.41 (.79) 44 3.66 (.78) 
3. Cost of living 44 3.41 (.79) 44 3.41 (1.00) 
4. Growth in district revenues 44 3.02 (1.00) 44 3.48 (.95) 
5. Teacher contract settlement 44 3.46 (1.07) 43 3.21 (1.10) 
6. Salaries of colleagues in region 44 3.07 (1.13) 44 4.18 (.62) 
7. Chanee in student oonulation numbers 44 2.46 (.19^ 44 2.59 f.87^ 
Totals 44 3.07 (1.04) 44 3.36 (1.03) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Presidents Superintendents 
Item Belief Statement N X (SD) N X (SD) 
Statements 8-12. Statements favoring performance based pay. 
8. Superintendents performance on job 
description 44 4.36 (.72) 44 4.59 (.50) 
9. Achievement of district goals 44 4.18 (.79) 44 4.32 (.86) 
10. School board evaluation 44 4.11 (.75) 44 4.43 (.50) 
11. Student achievement (outcomes) 44 3.21 (.85) 44 2.84 (1.08) 
12. Standardized test score results 44 2.55 r82> 44 2.02 (.88) 
Totals 44 3.68 (1.05) 44 3.64 (1.29) 
Part "A" of the survey instrument measured the participants' perceptions 
concerning how increases in compensation are currently awarded in the district. Belief 
statements one through seven in part "A" measured the participants' level of agreement or 
disagreement with the notion of increases in compensation based upon criteria 
considered to be out of the control of the superintendent or non-performance-based 
criteria. In this section board presidents and superintendents agreed that increases or 
decreases in student population numbers have low support for determining compensation 
increases for the superintendent. Both groups agreed that the contract settlement with the 
teachers' union has the highest degree of impact on the compensation increase awarded to 
the superintendent. Board presidents as a group gave moderate support to the relative 
importance of this variable in determining compensation increases. Superintendents 
gave a high level of support for the criterion of contract settlement with the teachers' 
union in having an impact upon the way that compensation increases are determined 
for the superintendent. 
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Belief statements eight through twelve in part "A" measured the participants' level 
of agreement or disagreement with the perception of increases in compensation based 
upon criteria considered to be dependent upon the performance levels of the 
superintendent. Results on standardized tests administered to students was viewed by 
both superintendents and board presidents as the one criterion with the least impact on 
the compensation levels of the superintendent. Both groups registered low support for 
the relative importance of this criterion as a basis for determining compensation 
increases for the superintendent. Both superintendents and board presidents rated 
performance in relation to the job description as the single most important factor in 
determining the compensation for the superintendent. Board presidents gave job 
description performance a high rating of 3.96 and superintendents ascribed moderate 
importance with a mean rating of 3.73 to this variable in determining compensation 
increases. There was consensus between the two groups that performance in relation to 
the job description was the single most important factor in determining the compensation 
for the superintendent. Board presidents gave this a high rating and superintendents 
ascribed moderate importance to this variable in determining compensation increases. 
Part "B" of the survey instrument measured the participants' beliefs concerning 
how increases in compensation should be awarded to the superintendent in the district. 
These ratings may be referred to in Table 2. Statements one through seven in part "B" 
measured the preferences for salary increases based upon criteria not controlled by the 
superintendent or, those criteria opposed to performance-based compensation. In this 
section, once again, both board presidents and superintendents gave the lowest mean 
score to "changes in student population numbers" as a consideration in determining the 
superintendent's compensation. Board presidents gave this a mean score of 2.46 and 
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superintendents rated this variable at 2.59. Both groups attributed moderate importance 
to this variable in determining compensation increases. 
Among board presidents, contract settlement with the teachers' union, with an 
average rating of 3.46, was viewed as the greatest single determiner of the 
superintendent's compensation among the variety of factors measured in this section. 
This criterion received a moderate rating in how compensation increases should be given 
to their superintendents. 
Among the superintendent group surveyed, relative compensations of other 
superintendents in conference schools was viewed as the single greatest determiner that 
the board of education should consider when setting the superintendent's compensation 
levels. This criterion was given a high rating with a mean of 4.18. 
Statements eight through twelve measured preferences for performance-based 
measures as criteria for compensation increases for the superintendent. The results of 
these ratings are referred to in Table 2. Board presidents and superintendents gave the 
highest rating to the superintendent's performance in relation to the job description as the 
greatest single factor in determining how compensation increases should be awarded to 
the superintendent. Both groups gave this variable a high rating. Standardized test 
scores were rated by both groups to be the least desirable factor of all possible criteria 
measured in this section for determining the superintendent's increase in compensation 
levels. Board presidents gave standardized test scores a moderate rating of 2.55 
concerning the impact on the superintendent's compensation increase whereas 
superintendents gave this a low rating of 2.02. 
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Inferential Statistical Results 
The next procedure was to test the five hypotheses proposed in Chapter 1. 
Comparison of board presidents and superintendents on compensation factors 
The first hypothesis to be tested was; There is no significant difference between 
board presidents and superintendents concerning their perceptions of how 
superintendents should be compensated as contrasted with how superintendents are 
currently being compensated. 
Belief statements utilized in the survey instrument to test this hypothesis are 
presented in the Appendix A and with mean results of the respondents presented in Table 
2. The survey instrument utilized a Likert type scale to measure the perceptions of 
respondents. A rating of one was given by a respondent to a belief statement with which 
the respondent strongly disagreed and a rating of five was given by a respondent to a 
belief statement with which the respondent strongly agreed. The hypothesis tested was; 
Ho"- ^s = ^^p 
Unpaired, two-tailed t-tests were used to determine if significant differences 
existed between board presidents and superintendents in their beliefs concerning 
compensation increases for superintendents on the four portions of the survey. A 
significance level of .05 was established for the purpose of testing this hypothesis. 
In the first portion of the survey the participants were asked to rate the relative 
importance of non-performance related criteria in establishing how salaries are currently 
awarded in districts. 
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Table 3. Results of unpaired, two-tailed t-test of group means for non-performance based 
criteria for current practices of determining superintendent compensation 
Group N S.D. Mean t value 2-tail prob. 
Board Presidents 44 .50 2.93 .18 .857 
Superintendent 44 .71 2.91 
There is an .857 level of probability that the differences measured by the survey 
instrument were arrived at by chance. Results in Table 3 lead to a failure to reject the 
null hypothesis at the .05 level of significance. There were no significant differences 
between superintendents and board presidents in the strength of their beliefs concerning 
the relative importance of non-performance criteria in determining compensation 
increases for the superintendent. 
A second test was conducted to determine if a significant difference existed 
between board presidents and superintendents in their beliefs concerning the importance 
of performance-based criteria in determining how salaries are currently determined for 
superintendents. An unpaired, two-tailed t-test was utilized to test for significant 
differences in aggregate means obtained from the two groups on the survey instrument. 
A significance level of .05 was established for the purpose of testing this hypothesis.. 
Results reported in Table 4 lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis. Significant 
differences existed between superintendents and board presidents in their beliefs 
concerning the relative importance of performance-based criteria in current practice for 
determining compensation increases for the superintendent. 
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Table 4. Results of unpaired, two-tailed t-test of group means for performance-based 
criteria for current practices of determining superintendent compensation 
2-tail 
Group N S.D. Mean t Value Prob. 
Board President 44 .90 3.23 2.2 .030 
Superintendent 44 .76 2.84 
There is a .03 level of probability that results were obtained by chance. 
Superintendents place a lower level of importance for compensation increases based on 
job performance than do board presidents in this study. 
A third test was performed to determine if significant differences existed between 
superintendents and board presidents concerning their rating of the relative importance of 
non-performance related criteria in determining how superintendents ideally should be 
awarded compensation increases. A significance level of .05 was established for the 
purpose of testing this hypothesis. 
Results in Table 5 lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis. Results indicated a 
significant level of difference between the two groups measured concerning their view of 
the relative importance of these criteria in how superintendents ideally should be 
compensated. Board presidents mean results of 3.07 were significantly less than the 
superintendents' mean results of 3.36. 
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Table 5. Results of unpaired, two-tailed t-test of group means for non-performance-
based criteria for ideally determining superintendent compensation 
2-tail 
Group N S.D. Mean t Value Prob. 
Board Presidents 44 .49 3.07 -2.70 .008 
Superintendents 44 .51 3.36 
There exists a .008 level of probability that differences in beliefs, as measured on 
the survey instrument, were arrived at by chance. 
A fourth test was performed to determine if significant differences existed 
between superintendents and board presidents concerning their rating of the relative 
importance of performance related criteria in determining how superintendents ideally 
should be awarded compensation increases. A significance level of .05 was established 
for the purpose of testing this hypothesis. 
Results in Table 6 lead to a failure to reject the null hypothesis. Results indicated 
no significant difference between the board presidents and superintendents in their 
beliefs of the relative importance of performance related criteria in establishing how the 
superintendent's compensation should ideally be established. 
Table 6. Results of unpaired, two-tailed t-test of group means for performance-based 
criteria for ideally determining superintendent compensation 
2-tail 
Group N S.D. Mean t-Value Prob. 
Board President 44 .46 3.68 .40 .690 
Superintendent 44 .50 3.64 
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Board president and superintendent perceptions of factors relating to compensation 
A second issue investigated in this research was the relative strength of beliefs of 
board presidents and superintendents toward performance and non-performance-based 
compensation. A second hypothesis tested is that there is no significant difference 
between mean scores of superintendents when comparing their responses to non-
performance-based compensation criteria to performance-based compensation criteria on 
the two portions of the survey instrument. 
A corollary hypothesis is that there is no significant difference between mean 
results of board presidents when compared on the responses on the there to be no 
differences between performance-based pay and non-performance-two portions of the 
survey instrument. In other words, do board presidents and superintendents perceive 
based compensation for superintendents both in current practice and in the ideal 
practice? That is, do board presidents and superintendents perceive one to be more 
important than the other? 
The hypothesis tested for superintendents was: 
M'Sl/c ~ ^^s2/c 
^A- J^si/i ^ f^s^/i 
The formula for board presidents was; 
Hq- Mhi/c " J^h2/c 
^^bl/i ^ ^^b2/i 
Paired t-tests were used to test for significant differences in opinion concerning 
whether superintendents should be compensated based on their performance or according 
to non-performance criteria. A significance level of .05 was established for the purpose 
of testing this hypothesis. 
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The first test of superintendents compared aggregate responses concerning current 
practices on questions one through seven, dealing with non-performance-based 
compensation with questions eight through twelve of the survey instrument dealing with 
performance-based compensation. The survey instrument may be referenced in 
Appendix A. 
Table 7. Results of paired, two-tailed t-test of group means comparing performance and 
non-performance criteria for determining superintendent compensation in 
current practices 
2-tail 
Group N S.D. Mean t-Value Prob. 
Current, Ques. 1-7 44 .71 2.91 .58 .5636 
Current, Ques. 8-12 44 .76 2.84 
In current practice perceptions, there was no significant difference in the 
aggregate response of superintendents to statements rating the relative importance of 
performance-based compensation when compared to non-performance-based 
compensation for superintendents. The null hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference between mean scores of superintendents when comparing their responses to 
non-performance based compensation criteria to performance-based compensation 
criteria on the two portions of the survey instrument led to a failure to reject the null 
hypothesis. A two-tailed probability level of .5636 indicates that there exists too high a 
probability level that differences obtained on the two different portions of the survey are 
a result of chance. 
In the ideal practices for compensation, superintendents gave a higher ranking to 
performance-based criteria for compensation over non-performance criteria. A 
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paired, two-tailed t-test produced significant differences between superintendent 
responses on the two sets of the criteria. A significance level of .05 was established for 
the purpose of testing this hypothesis. Performance-based compensation criteria received 
a significantly higher aggregate response than did non-performance-based compensation 
criteria in the survey questions asked to determine perceptions of how the superintendent 
should be compensated. Table 8 below portrays t-test results. 
Table 8. Results of paired, two-tailed t-test comparing group means for performance 
and non-performance criteria for determining superintendent compensation in 
ideal settings 
2-tail 
Group N S.D. Mean t Value Prob. 
Ideal, Ques. 1-7 44 .50 3.36 -2.46 .018 
Ideal, Ques. 8-12 44 .51 3.64 
Results lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis. The probability level is .018 
that the different results obtained on the two portions of the survey instrument are the 
result of chance. 
Tests of significance were also performed on aggregate responses of board 
presidents. A test of current practices of compensation for superintendents revealed a 
significant difference in board presidents' perceptions of whether performance-based 
criteria is more important than non-performance-based criteria in current practices of 
superintendent compensation. Table 9 below represents the results of the measured 
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perceptions of board presidents. A significance level of .05 was established for testing 
this hypothesis. Results in Table 9 lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis. A 
significant difference exists between ratings of performance and non-performance-based 
criteria for current practices of superintendent compensation. 
Table 9. Results of paired, two-tailed t-test comparing group means for performance 
and non-performance criteria for determining superintendent compensation 
in current practice 
2-tail 
Group N S.D. Mean t Value Prob. 
Current, Ques. 1-7 44 .58 2.93 -2.22 .0317 
Current, Ques. 8-12 44 .90 3.23 
The null hypothesis that there are no significant differences in responses to the 
two sets of criteria for compensation of superintendents is not rejected. A probability 
level of .0317 exists that different results obtained on the two portions of the survey 
instrument are a result of chance. 
When questioned on their perception of how superintendents ideally should be 
compensated, board presidents clearly gave higher ratings, when measured by aggregate 
responses, to performance-based criteria. A significance level of .05 was established for 
the purpose of testing this hypothesis. Results in Table 10 following lead to a rejection 
of the null hypothesis. A significant difference exists between ratings of performance 
and non-performance-based criteria for superintendent compensation in the ideal setting. 
A probability level of .0001 exists that survey differences resulted from chance. 
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Table 10. Results of paired, two-tailed t-test of group means for performance and 
non- performance criteria for determining superintendent compensation in 
ideal settings 
2-tail 
Group N S.D. Mean t Value Prob. 
Ideal, Ques. 1-7 44 .49 3.07 -6.05 .0001 
Ideal, Ques. 8-12 44 .46 3.68 
The hypothesis that there are no significant differences between comparative 
ratings of criteria in current practice as opposed to ratings of criteria ideal in practices for 
superintendents' compensation is rejected. 
Board president and superintendent comparisons of current practices and ideal practices 
How do board presidents and superintendents responses to current practices 
compare with their responses to "how things should be" in an ideal setting? The null 
hypothesis is that there is no significant difference between the perceptions of either 
group concerning current compensation practices and how things should be concerning 
compensation for superintendents. The hypothesis tested was: 
Ho- Mgi/c ~ ^'•si/i 
^A- ^^s2/c ^ '^s2/i 
For board presidents the formula was: 
Hq- t^b'/c ~ ^''bVi 
^A- %2/c ^^b2/i 
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The first test compared superintendent responses on questions one through seven 
- current practices - of the survey instrument to questions one through seven - ideal 
practices. Questions one through seven measured non-performance aspects of 
superintendent compensation. 
Paired, two-tailed t-tests were used to test for significant differences in opinion of 
both groups to responses of the survey instrument. A significance level of .05 was 
estabhshed for the purpose of testing this hypothesis. 
Results in Table 11 lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference between the perceptions of either group concerning current 
compensation practices and how things should be concerning compensation for 
superintendents. Superintendent perceptions concerning current practice related to how 
things are non-performance compensation differ significantly from their perceptions of 
ideal practice. A probability level of .0002 indicates that the probability is .0002 that 
differences obtained in survey results are a result of chance. 
Table 11. Results of paired, two-tailed t-test of group means comparing current 
practices and ideal criteria opposed to performance-based superintendent 
compensation 
2-tail 
Group N S.D. Mean t Value Prob. 
Current, Ques. 1-7 44 .71 2.91 -4.14 .0002 
Ideal, Ques. 1-7 44 .51 3.36 
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The next test was to compare superintendent responses on questions eight through 
twelve. Questions 8-12 measured performance-based compensation as it is currently 
practiced and questions 8-12 measured beliefs concerning the relative importance of 
performance measures when considering how the superintendent should be compensated 
in the ideal situation. A significance level of .05 was established for this test. 
When analyzing the resuhs of this test, another significant difference in aggregate 
means is evident. Superintendents perceived that in an ideal setting, performance-based 
compensation should play a more important role than it does currently. Results presented 
in Table 12 lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference 
between the perceptions of either group concerning current compensation practices and 
how things should be concerning compensation for superintendents. Results were 
significant at a .0001 level of probability that resulting differences were obtained by 
chance. 
Table 12. Results of paired, two-tailed t-test of group means comparing current 
practices and ideal practices of performance-based superintendent 
compensation 
2-tail 
Group N S.D. Mean t Value Prob. 
Current, Ques. 8-12 44 .76 2.84 -6.89 .0001 
Ideal, Ques. 8-12 44 .50 3.64 
Board presidents on the other hand rated non-performance-based compensation 
less important for deteimining superintendent salaries in ideal circumstances. In a 
paired, two-tailed t-test of significant differences with a rejection level established at .05, 
results comparing aggregate means for current practices with "how things should be" 
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showed no significant difference between responses of board presidents on the two 
portions of the survey instrument. The measured differences indicated a probability of 
.0693 that the differences resulted from chance. This probability level, found to be 
greater than the established significance level of .05, lead to a confirmation of the null 
hypothesis. 
Clearly, board presidents felt that in an ideal setting, non-performance based pay 
should not play an important role. This is evident when comparing mean results in Table 
13 to results in Table 14. 
Table 13. Results of paired, two-tailed t-test of group means comparing current 
practices and ideal criteria for determining superintendent compensation 
by board presidents. 
2-tail 
Group N S.D. Mean t-Value Prob. 
Current, Ques. 1-7 44 .58 2.93 -1.86 .0693 
Ideal, Ques. 1-7 44 .49 3.07 
Table 14. Results of paired, two-tailed t-test of group means comparing current 
practices and ideal criteria for determining superintendent compensation by 
board presidents 
2-tail 
Group N S.D. Mean t Value Prob. 
Current, Ques. 8-12 44 .90 3.23 -4.38 .0001 
Ideal, Ques. 8-12 44 .46 3.68 
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Performance-based compensation for superintendents had a significantly greater 
mean aggregate score when considered in an ideal setting. Results in Table 14 lead to a 
rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the 
perceptions of either group concerning current practices and how things should be 
concerning compensation for superintendents when the significance level is established 
at .05. The test reported in Table 14 yields a probability level of .0001 that differences in 
the aggregate mean results were a result of chance. 
Testing for mean differences 
The results of this research were combined with results of other research 
conducted by Behounek et al. in which 44 school systems were surveyed using the 
"School System Perceived Quality Assessment Instrument" developed at the Department 
of Professional Studies at Iowa State University. This quality review study was an 
attempt to survey the participating districts to determine the level of quality in the district 
as measured by criteria developed according to the standards of quality improvement 
drawn from the work of W. Edwards Deming. The surveys were administered to 
various employee groups and the employees within each group were randomly selected. 
Results of the survey were aggregated to produce one quality index rating per school 
district. The participating 44 school districts in the quality assessment study were the 
same as the 44 districts participating in this study. 
A fourth hypothesis tested is that there is no significant difference in the school 
districts' perceived quality as measured by the quality review study when compared by 
three categories of relative strength of superintendent beliefs in non-performance-based 
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compensation and performance-based compensation. The hypothesis tested was: 
Hq: |Lil = 1^2 = 
Ha: ^1 1^2 ^3 1^4 
Mean scores of the 44 school districts based upon the quality review study were 
compared based upon superintendent beliefs on the relative merits of performance-based 
compensation for superintendents in this study to determine if any significant differences 
existed among superintendent perceptions concerning the ideal practices for 
superintendent compensation. Superintendent strength of belief in non-performance-
based compensation were categorized as low, moderate, or high based upon mean 
responses to the appropriate section of the survey instrument. A significance level of .05 
was established for the purpose of testing this hypothesis. 
The independent variable was the measured perception of the superintendents on 
the merit of performance compensation and the dependent variable was the current 
quality assessment of the various school systems. 
The first test compared the school districts' quality ratings received in the quality 
review study by the categorical ratings of the superintendents of each school district rated 
as low, moderate, and high in their strength of belief in performance-based compensation 
in ideal practices of compensation. The results should be viewed with caution since the 
group sizes were quite small, as shown in Table 15 and 16. The category of low included 
mean scores from one to 2.59. The category of moderate included mean scores from 2.6 
to four and the category of high included scores from 4.1 to five. These categories were 
arbitrarily selected for this research for purposes of comparison. A significance level of 
.05 was established for the purpose of testing this hypothesis. 
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Table 15. ANOVA summary table comparing quality rating of school systems by 
strength of belief of superintendent in non-performance based pay 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source d.f. Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between groups 2 .11 .05 .61 .548 
Within groups 41 3.53 .09 
Total 43 3.64 
Group N Mean S.D. 
Low belief in non-performance compensation 4 3.27 .35 
Moderate belief in non-performance compensation 37 3.36 .28 
High belief in non-performance compensation 3 3.18 .31 
Total 44 3.34 .29 
Inspection of Table 15 reveals no significant difference among superintendents. 
There is a probability level of .548 that differences in quality indexes when grouped by 
strength of belief in non-performance-based criteria were caused by chance. 
When the ratings of the school districts in the quality review study are compared 
by the three categories of superintendent beliefs considered to be opposed to 
performance-based compensation, the results show no significant difference in mean 
scores of quality ratings of the various school systems involved. 
There exists a probability level of .974 that differences reported from the surveys 
were a result of chance. The results of test one lead to a failure to reject the null 
hypothesis. 
The second test compared school districts' quality rating received in the quality 
review study by the categorical ratings of the superintendents of each school district rated 
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as low, moderate, and high in their strength of belief in performance-based compensation 
in ideal practices for compensating the superintendent. The category of low included 
mean scores from one to three. The category of moderate included mean scores from 3.1 
to 4.25 and the category of high included scores from 4.26 to five. These categories were 
arbitrarily established in this research for comparison purposes. Inspection of Table 16 
reveals no significant difference among superintendents at the .05 level of significance. 
When the ratings of the school districts in the quality review study are compared 
by the three categories of superintendent beliefs in performance-based compensation, the 
results show no significant difference in mean scores of quality ratings of the various 
school systems involved. The probability level that differences in results are the product 
of chance are .303. The results of test two lead to a failure to reject the null hypothesis. 
Table 16. ANOVA summary table comparing quality rating of school systems by 
strength of belief of superintendent in performance-based compensation 
Sum of Mean F F 
Source d.f Squares Squares Ratio Prob. 
Between groups 2 
Within groups 41 
Total 43 
.21 .1 1.23 .303 
3.43 .08 
3.64 
Group N Mean S.D. 
Low belief in performance compensation 6 3.42 .22 
Moderate belief in performance compensation 35 3.35 .30 
High belief in performance compensation 3 3.10 .34 
Total 44 3.34 .29 
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Although insignificant by the standards established for this study, the results do 
reveal interesting patterns. A trend is evident in the data. The group of superintendents 
with the highest mean response indicating a belief in performance-based compensation 
served in districts with the lowest mean quality index (3.10). The group of 
superintendents with the lowest mean response indicating a low belief in performance-
based compensation served in districts with the highest mean quality index (3.42). As 
school systems are grouped by the categorized beliefs of the superintendent in 
performance-based compensation, the aggregate mean scores of the quality of the 
districts increase while the categorical beliefs of the superintendents in support of 
performance-based compensation decline. The results of test two lead to an examination 
of the data to determine if any significant relationship exists between the perceived 
quality of a school districts and the level of beliefs of the districts' superintendents in 
performance-based compensation. 
Test of relationship between beliefs and quality 
Does a relationship exist between the strength of beliefs of the superintendent in 
performance compensation and the level of perceived quality of the school system 
served? A fifth hypothesis tested is that there is no relationship between the level of 
perception of the superintendent in performsmce compensation and the perceived level of 
quality of the district. The hypothesis tested was; 
Ho: p > .50 
p > .50 
In a test to determine if a relationship exists between the perceived quality of a 
school district and the strength of support of the superintendent for performance-based 
66 
compensation, a correlational test was performed to determine the level of the 
associational relationship. The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient test was 
performed to determine the level of associational relationship. It is defined as: 
N _ 
2i= ,  (x j -x) (y i -y)  
r = 
(N-OS^Sy 
Results in Table 17 show a slight negative correlation between these two variables. 
Table 17. Correlation table comparing quality rating of school systems by strength of 
belief of superintendent in performance-based compensation 
Count Covariance Correlation R-Squared 
44 -.03 -.18 .03 
A negative correlation of -.18 is determined to be "little if any". (Hinkle, et al. 
p. 118). In other words there is little, if any, relationship between districts' quality 
assessment ratings and the superintendents perceived support for performance-based 
compensation. Results lead to an acceptance of the null hypothesis. 
One of the concerns of this study was to determine whether there was a 
relationship between the beliefs of the superintendent in performance compensation and 
the level of perceived quality of the school system served. The findings showed very 
little relationship between these two variables, in fact, a slight negative correlation of -
. 18 did exist. This may place credibility in W. Edwards Deming's theory that 
performance or merit pay has a detrimental effect on an organization. 
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CHAPTER V: SUMMARY 
The primary purposes of this study were to determine the manner in which 
superintendents and school board presidents perceive that superintendents of selected 
Iowa school districts are currently awarded salary increases and to determine how 
superintendents should ideally be awarded salary increases. A third purpose of this study 
was to determine the perceived quality index of selected school districts in the state of 
Iowa. After determining the perceived quality index of these schools, still another 
purpose was to determine if there was a relationship between the perceived quality index 
of these selected Iowa school districts and the method of compensation for 
superintendents of the selected schools in Iowa. 
A questionnaire was developed to assess the status and perceptions of 
performance-based compensation of school superintendents. The instrument listed 
twelve methods of compensating superintendents, and elicited perceptions about each. It 
was validated by a panel of nine practicing school administrators and researchers and 
twelve board members who are currently serving on boards of education or have recently 
served on school boards. Both the panel of practicing school administrators and 
researchers and the twelve board members indicated that the survey instrument was clear 
and would adequately serve the purpose for which it was developed. Reliability tests of 
instruments for performance based compensation indicate acceptance of the instrument 
utilizing guidance of Alpha limits as suggested by Nunnally and Durham. Results from 




The current status of methods affecting superintendent compensation was elicited 
and few differences were found. Board presidents and superintendents agreed that 
increases or decreases in student population numbers have low support for determining 
salary increases for superintendents. 
Board presidents and superintendents agreed that the teacher's union settlements 
have the most significant impact on salary increases. Contract settlement has the highest 
degree of impact on the compensation increase awarded to the superintendent. 
Standardized or norm referenced tests were ranked as having the least impact on 
the salary of the superintendents by both superintendents and board presidents. 
Job description performance was viewed as being an important factor for 
determining salary increases by board presidents but was viewed of only moderate 
importance by superintendents. 
The ideal methods of compensation were sought by the instrument, and indicated 
both board presidents and superintendents agreed that changes in student population 
should have the least impact on superintendent pay increases. Slight or moderate 
increases in student population seem to have little effect on the superintendent's duties. 
Even though board presidents felt that the amount of the contract settlements with 
teachers' union had the greatest impact on increased compensation for the superintendent, 
superintendents gave this only a moderate rating on how compensation increases should 
be given. 
While superintendents felt increased compensation should be awarded in 
accordance with superintendents' salaries of school districts who are members of the 
same athletic conference, school board presidents gave this only a moderate rating. 
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Board presidents and superintendents rated the superintendent's performance in 
relation to the job description as the greatest single factor in determining how 
compensation increases should be awarded to the superintendent. Standardized tests 
were rated the least desirable by both groups. 
Inferential Statistical Results 
The first hypothesis stated that there was no significant difference between board 
presidents and superintendents concerning their perceptions of how superintendents are 
currently being compensated and the ideal basis of awarding increased compensation. A 
rating of one was given by a respondent to a belief statement with which the respondent 
strongly disagreed and a rating of five was given by a respondent to a belief statement 
with which the respondent strongly agreed. A rating of three was considered a moderate 
response. Unpaired, two tailed t-tests were used to test for significant differences at the 
.05 level of significance. 
In the first portion of the survey (seven questions), respondents were asked to rate 
the importance of non-performance related criteria in establishing how salaries are 
currently awarded in districts. Results led to a failure to reject the null hypothesis. There 
were no significant differences between superintendents and board presidents in the 
strength of their beliefs concerning the relative importance of non-performance criteria in 
determining compensation increases for the superintendent. 
In testing the responses dealing with Current Status (questions 8-12), an unpaired, 
two tailed t-test was again utilized to determine if a significant difference existed 
between the mean ratings of board presidentsmnd superintendents in their beliefs 
concerning the importance of performance-based criteria in determining the manner in 
which salaries are currently determined for superintendents. The results reported lead to 
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a rejection of the null hypothesis. Significant differences were found between mean 
responses of superintendents and board presidents in their beliefs concerning the relative 
importance of performance-based criteria in current practice for determining 
compensation increases for the superintendent. In this study, superintendents placed a 
lower level of importance than did board presidents for compensation increases based 
upon job performance, which indicates that board presidents placed a greater emphasis 
on performance based criteria for determining salary increases than superintendents. 
A third test was performed to determine if significant differences existed between 
superintendents and board presidents concerning their ratings of the relative importance 
of non-performance related criteria in determining how superintendents in ideal practice 
should be awarded salary increases. Again, results led to a rejection of the null 
hypothesis. A significant level of difference was determined between the two groups 
measured concerning their view of the relative importance of these non-performance 
related criteria in determining how superintendents ideally should be compensated. 
A fourth test was performed to determine whether significant differences existed 
between superintendents and board presidents concerning their rating of the relative 
importance of specific performance related criteria in determining how superintendents 
ideally should be awarded compensation increases. These criteria included 
superintendent's performance on job description, achievement of district goals, school 
board evaluation, student achievement (outcomes), and standardized test scores. Results 
led to a failure to reject the null hypothesis at the .05 level. There was no significant 
difference between board presidents and superintendents in their beliefs of the relative 
importance of specific performance-related criteria in establishing how the 
superintendent's compensation should ideally be established. 
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A second hypothesis was tested to see if there was a significant difference 
between mean scores of superintendents when comparing their responses to non­
performance based compensations criteria on the two portions of the survey instrument. 
In other words, do board presidents and superintendents perceive there to be no 
differences between performance-based pay and non-performance-based compensation 
for superintendents both in current practice and in the ideal practice? Using paired t-tests 
with a significance level of .05, the result was to accept the null hypothesis. There was 
no significant difference in the aggregate response of superintendents to statements rating 
the relative importance of performance based compensation when compared to non­
performance based compensation for superintendents. However, a test of current 
practices of compensation for superintendents revealed a significant difference in board 
presidents' perceptions of whether performance-based criteria is more important than 
non-performance-based criteria. Clearly, board presidents preferred performance-based 
pay more than did superintendents. 
In the ideal practices of compensation, however, superintendents gave a 
significantly higher ranking to performance based criteria for compensation over non­
performance based criteria. Therefore, these results led to a rejection of the null 
hypothesis. When tests of significance were performed on responses of board presidents, 
there revealed significant differences in board presidents' perceptions in the ideal 
situation of whether performance-based criteria was more important than non-
performance-based criteria. Thus, the null hypothesis that there are no significant 
differences in responses to the two sets of criteria for compensation of superintendents 
was rejected. 
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When questioned on their perceptions of how superintendents ideally should be 
compensated, board presidents clearly gave higher ratings to performance based criteria. 
This then led to the rejection of the null hypothesis, but there were no significant 
differences between comparative ratings of criteria in current practice as opposed to 
ratings of criteria in the ideal setting for superintendents' compensation. 
Comparisons of Current Practices and Ideal Practices 
The next portion of the study elicited responses from board presidents and 
superintendents comparing current practices of awarding compensation for 
superintendents with their responses to how things should be in an ideal setting. The null 
hypothesis stated that there was no significant difference between the perceptions of 
either group concerning current compensation practices and how things should be 
concerning compensation for superintendents. The first test compared superintendent 
responses on questions one through seven (current practices) of the survey instrument to 
questions one through seven (ideal practices). Again, paired two-tailed t-tests were used 
to test for significance at the .05 level. The results of this led to a rejection of the null 
hypothesis. Superintendents' perceptions concerning current practice related to non­
performance based compensation differed significantly (.0002) from their perceptions of 
ideal practice. This meant that superintendents preferred to be compensated more on 
their performance than on non-performance criteria. 
When comparing superintendents' responses on questions eight through twelve 
(current practice) with questions eight through twelve (ideal practice), a significant 
difference was evident. Superintendents perceived that in an ideal setting, performance 
based compensation should play a more important role than it does currently. Thus, this 
led to a rejection of the null hypothesis. 
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Again utilizing the paired, two-tailed t-test, board presidents rated non­
performance based compensation less important than performance-based compensation 
for determining superintendents' salaries in ideal circumstances. Clearly, board 
presidents felt that in an ideal setting, non-performance-based compensation should not 
play an important role. Performance-based compensation for superintendents had a 
significantly greater mean aggregate score when considered in an ideal setting. This led 
to a rejection of the null hypothesis, indicating that board presidents would prefer to use 
performance ratings for determining superintendents' pay levels. 
Quality Improvement Analysis 
A fourth hypothesis tested was that there was no significant difference in the 
school districts' perceived quality as measured by the perceived quality instrument when 
compared among three levels of relative strength of superintendent perceptions in non-
performance-based compensation and performance-based compensation. 
By using the results of the "perceived quality index rating" of the 44 school 
districts and comparing these results to the superintendents' beliefs on the relative merits 
of the performance based compensation for superintendents, this study attempted to 
determine if any significant differences existed among groups of superintendents in 
perceptions concerning superintendent compensation. 
The independent variable measured was the perception of the superintendents on 
the efficacy of performance-based compensation and the dependent variable was the 
current quality assessment of the various school systems. 
The first test compared the quality ratings of the districts with the strength of 
beliefs of superintendents in non-performance-based compensation. In other words, is 
there a difference between the beliefs of superintendents in non-performance-based 
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compensation and the perceived quality rating of the school district? The study indicates 
no significant difference among superintendents at the .05 level of acceptance. The 
results lead to a failure to reject the null hyiwthesis. 
The second test compared the school districts' quality rating received in the 
quality review portion of the study wdth the superintendents' beliefs in performance based 
compensation in ideal practices for compensating the superintendent. Again using the 
analysis of variance summary with a .05 level of acceptance, when the ratings of the 
school districts in the quality review study are compared by the superintendents' beliefs in 
performance based compensation, the results showed no significant difference in mean 
scores of quality ratings of the various school systems involved. 
Finally, the fifth hypothesis tested was that there is no relationship between the 
level of agreement of superintendents for performance-based compensation and the 
perceived level of quality of the district. A correlational test was performed to determine 
the level of the associational relationship. A slight negative correlation of -.18 was found 
which shows little, if any, relationship between the two variables. This negative 
correlation means a slight inverse relationship showing that the higher the quality index 
of the school, the lower the superintendents supported performance based compensation. 
This then would be consistent with Deming's philosophy that performance-based 
compensation may have a negative effect on the quality of the organization. 
Conclusions 
There were a number of major purposes for this research. Among these were to 
determine the manner in which the superintendents and board presidents of selected 
school districts perceived that salary increases are granted, and to determine the methods 
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of reward for superintendents that are preferred by selected Iowa school superintendents 
and board presidents. Finally this study determined the perceived quality index of 
selected school districts in the state of Iowa and whether there was a relationship 
between the perceived quality index of Iowa school districts and the level and methods of 
compensation of Iowa superintendents. 
The findings indicated a number of conclusions from the research. Among these 
were board presidents and superintendents agreed that increases or decreases in student 
population numbers should have little effect in determining compensation increases for 
the superintendent. Board presidents and superintendents also agreed that standardized 
testing to measure student academic achievement should not be used in awarding salary 
increases. There seemed to be little credibility by both groups in the use of these tests 
and therefore, such testing would not be criteria for awarding salary increases. Another 
area of agreement was that there seemed to be a feeling of equity or fairness in that board 
presidents and superintendents felt that what was awarded in the teachers' settlement 
should be awarded to the superintendent. Finally, board presidents perceived that duties 
listed under a job description are criteria which can be used for awarding salary 
increases. This would indicate that board presidents and, to a lesser degree, 
superintendents felt that if the superintendent performed according to the job description 
the salary should be increased accordingly. 
Next, the study sought to determine if the perceived practices of board presidents 
and superintendents about how salary increases are awarded differ from current practices. 
Also the study sought to determine how board presidents and superintendents felt salary 
increases should be awarded in ideal circumstances. Conclusions drawn from this 
indicated that there seemed to be a feeling from both board presidents and 
superintendents that even though the student population may increase or decrease, the 
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duties and responsibilities of the superintendent remained fairly consistent. There was 
definite agreement between board presidents and superintendents that the job description 
should be considered most heavily when salary increases were awarded and standardized 
testing should be least considered. It seemed that both groups agreed that performance in 
relation to the job was an important and measureable factor to be considered for 
compensation. There seemed to be little confidence on the part of board presidents and 
superintendents for using standardized test scores as a measure of either student gains or 
a means of awarding superintendent pay increases. 
Another conclusion was that board presidents felt that the superintendent's pay 
increases should be related to the settlement with the teachers to promote some sort of 
equity or fairness. Superintendents tended to somewhat agree with this method of 
awarding salary increases. However, there was a feeling among some superintendents 
that because of the nature and responsibilities of the superintendency, salary increases 
should be considered separately from the teachers' settlement. 
Another finding was that there was a significant difference in beliefs between 
superintendents and board presidents concerning non-performance and performance-
based criteria for determining salary increases. Board presidents supported performance-
based criteria more heavily than did superintendents for awarding increased salary 
compensation. Clearly, board presidents were interested in how well superintendents 
were doing the job they were hired to do as so indicated by the rating given to the 
superintendent's job description as criteria for awarding superintendent salary increases. 
Superintendents placed a significantly lower level of importance than did board 
presidents for compensation increases based upon job performance even though they felt 
that in an ideal setting, performance-based compensation should play a more important 
role than it currently plays. 
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Political movements favoring performance-based or merit pay would find little or 
no support for such practice from this study. Research findings should be vigorously 
pursued for practical significance and implications for the field of education. 
Finally this study concludes that there would be some credibility in W. Edwards 
Deming's belief that the quality of the organization may be negatively affected by 
performance based pay. Although not a strong finding, there is a slight negative 
correlation between the awarding of salary increases based upon performance criteria and 
the perceived qualtiy rating of the school district. This may indicate that Deming may be 
correct in stating that salary increases based upon performance could negatively affect an 
organization. If the conclusion can be drawn that performance or merit pay may 
negatively affect the quality of an organization, then use of performance or merit pay as a 
reward system must be carefully scrutinized. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
Following this study, it would seem necessary to test the questionnaires in other 
studies to check for validity and reliability of the instruments used by Bax, Poston, and 
this study. Since the superintendent's salary survey was used on a small sample of the 
population, more extensive testing of this instrument for research purposes may be 
beneficial. 
The School System Perceived Quality Assessment Instrument was used on a 
much larger sample of the population; therefore, reliability and validity may be 
significantly greater. A study which would certainly be of value would be to see if there 
is a correlation between the quality rating of the school and the academic achievement of 
students. 
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Finally, the results of the research seem to confirm, at least moderately, W. 
Edwards Deming's statement that performance and/or merit ratings or pay may negatively 
affect the quality of an organization. Although this research did not find a strong 
correlation, a weak inverse correlation did exist, which may affirm Deming's theory. 
Further research in this area would seem to be valuable. 
Other topics or questions related to this study which would seem to be of interest 
would be; 
1. What are the effects on superintendent's motivation for compensation, or of 
what importance is pay to the superintendent? 
2. How should comparable or neighboring districts be used in salary 
determination, i.e., is compensation more of an area or regional factor? 
3. Is district size important for compensation, i.e., is the superintendent's job 
fairly consistent regardless of the size of school? 
4. How does the negotiated settlement for teachers affect superintendent salary 
increases? 
5. What are actual feelings about standardized testing? Is there a universal 
feeling that standardized testing is not valid or that student performance 
is not important? 
6. What are superintendent's feelings about performing the job description? Do 
some superintendents feel so confident in their job performance that they 
should be paid accordingly? 
7. Determining the quality rating of a school could be an important study in itself 
in determining the feelings of the clientele in how well the school is serving 
the needs of the public. 
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8. How are performance ratings of superintendents and methods used in 
superintendents' evaluations related? Are superintendents evaluated more on 
subjective or objective criteria? 
These are only some of the related areas which merit further research on the topic 
of awarding salary increases for superintendents. In itself, the awarding of salary 
increases still seems to be a vague process and fairly inconsistent in the manner in which 
it is done. 
Performance-based pay for superintendents may have a negative effect on the 
quality of the organization as found in this study. This could be researched to a greater 
degree. However, the study seems to indicate, even though it is not a substantially strong 
finding, that W. Edwards Deming's beliefs about performance or merit pay may be 
accurate and performance-based compensation does indeed negatively affect the system. 
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APPENDIX 
CURRENT AND PREFERRED METHODS 
OF AWARDING SWERINTENDENT SALARY INCREASES 
Superintendents Demo^ftanhie Information Board Presidents 
Male Male 
Female Female 
Highfif' Pegiw Avhi<;v<?<J 
B.S.(B.A.)+ (fill in blank) Number of years of 
M.S. (M.A.) School Board Service 
M.S. (M.A.)+ (fill in blank) to this district 
Specialist or 6th Year Certificate (count this year as onet 
Specialist or 6th Year Ccrtificatc+ 
Ph.D. (A.B.D.) Number of years as 
Ph.D. School Board President 
Number of years as Superintendent (count this year as one'> 
(Count this year as one) 
SizeofDistrict (K-12> Si/.eofDistrietfK-12) 







3500 + 3500 + 
Each year, most Superintendents enter into some sort of salary negotiations with the School Board to detennine a salaiy 
increase for the next school year. In your best judgement, how would you weigh these factors in detcnnining the superintendent's salary 
incrca.se in your district: 
Not at all Somewhat Strongly Heavily 
Considered Considered Considered Considered Considered 
1. Length of Service to District I 2 3 4 5 
2. Increased Formal Education (In-Service Training) 1 2 3 4 5 
3. "Cost of Living" 1 2 3 4 5 
4. New money award to district/allowable growth 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Teachers' negotiated settlement 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Salaries of other superintendents in conference 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Inciease/dccrcase in student population 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Performance on superintendent's job description 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Achievement of district goals/long ninge goals 1 2 3 4 5 
10. School Board Evaluation 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Student achievement (outcomes) 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Standardized Test Scores Results I 2 3 4 5 
13. Other 1 2 3 4 5 
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In rank order, with # I being the flrst choicc, please list the three major factors currently being used to determine the 
superintendent's salary' increase. 
I. 
3. 
In your best judgment, what would you prefer Superintendents' annual salaiy increase be based upon. 
•Strongly No Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Opinion Agree Apree-
1. Annual salary increases for the Suspcrintendcnt 12 3 4 5 
should be related to the length of sennee to 
the district. 
2. Annual salary increases for the Superintendent 1 2 3 4 5 
should be related to increased formal education 
or in-service training. 
3. Annua! salary increases for the Superintendent 1 2 3 4 5 
should be closely related to "the cost of living" 
increase. 
4. Aimual salary increases for the Superintendent 1 2 3 4 5 
should be related to district "new money"? 
allowable growth received. 
5. Aimual salary increases for the Superintendent 1 2 3 4 5 
should be related to the teacher settlement. 
6. Annual salary increases for the Superintendent 1 2 3 4 5 
should be related to salaries of other 
Superintendents in schools of similar size. 
7. Annual salary increases for the Superintendent 1 2 3 4 5 
should be related to the increase in student 
population, 
8. Annual salaiy increases for the Superintendent 1 2 3 4 5 
should be related to performance on the 
Superintendent's job description. 
9. Annual salary increases for the Superintendent 12 3 4 5 
should be related to the achievement of District 
Goals/Organizational Goals. 
10. Annual salary increases for the Superintendent 12 3 4 5 
should be related to evxiluations from the School 
Board. 
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It. Annual salary increases for the 
Superintendent should be related to student 
achievement (outcomes). 
12. Annual salai>' increases for the Superintendent 
should be related to standardized test scores. 
13. Other 
12 3 4 
12 3 4 
In rank order, with S1 being the first choice, please list the three factors which you would prefer to have considered for the 
Superintendent's annual salary' increase. 
1. 
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VALIDATION PANEL OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
CONCERNING PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION 
Current Practicing Superintendents 
Mr. Richard D. Turner, Superintendent 
East Union Community Schools 
Mr. Don Brichacek, Superintendent 
Interstate-35 Community Schools 
Mr. Phil Burmeister, Superintendent 
Mount Ayr Community Schools 
Mr. Jerry Hoffman, Superintendent 
Wayne Community Schools 
Dr. Cal Owens, Superintendent 
Poplar Grove Public Schools 
Mr. Tom Spear, Superintendent 
Central Decatur Community Schools 
Others: 
Dr. Gene Fokken 
Retired Superintendent 
Dr. Anton Netusil 
Iowa State University Professor 
Research and Evaluation 
Dr. James Stone 
Retired Assistant Superintendent 
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School System Perceived Quality Assessment Instrument 
Department of Professional Studies - Iowa State University 
To the Participant: This instrument request information from you and your colleagues about perceptions 
of the level of quality found in your school system's operations and activities. Please provide the information 
requested below, and complete the rating section on the next two pages as instructed below. All you need 
to do when you have completed this instrument is to fold it, tape it closed, and drop it in the U.S. Mail. 
Thanks for your help and cooperation. Your responses will help in future efforts to improve education. 
Part I: Demographic Information 
Please provide the following information; 
1. Position: Teacher Support Staff Administrator Superintendent Board Other 
2. Home Annua] Income: Under $10,000 $10,000-29,999 $30,000-40,999 Over $50,000 
3. Gender: Male Female 4. Age: Under 18 30-55 56-70 Over 70 
5. Level of Education: Less than B.A. degree Master's degree Doctorate degree 
6. Yean Experience in Current/Similar Job: UnderSyrs 5-IOyrs 11-25)TS. 25yrs.ormore 
Part II: Rating of School System Quality Components 
Directions: Please state your judgment of the current situation and the desired or ideal situation in your 
school system. Consider the statements on the following two pages carefully, and indicate the degree to 
which you feel each statement describes your school system. Note that you are asked to respond to each 
statement twice: once in the current situation column, and once again in the desired situation column. 
Definitions: 1. Current Situation; What ia the status of your school system now in terms of the 
statement - what do you see is the present state of affairs on this item? 
2. Desired Situation: What should the status of your school system be in terms of the 
statement — what would you like to see or find in your system on this item? 
Please respond in both columns (current and desired) on each statement, and mark only one response for 
each statement in each column. 
RESPONSES ARE STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
AND WILL BE REPORTED ONLY IN SUMMARY FORM BY DISTRICT 
After completing the instrument, please fold and tape it closed, and drop it in the U.S. Mail. Thank you for 
your assistance and cooperation! 
Please open the instrument, and proceed with the next section. 
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School System Perceived Quality Assessment Instrument 
Directions: Please rate each of the following statements. The rating is; 
A = I agree strongly. 
B = I agree. 
C = I am not sure. 
D = I disagree. 
E = Idis^ee strondv. 
Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each item. 
Respond to berth"columns on each hem, and mark only one response in each column. 
CURRENT PESlRgP 
A. Leadership 
1. District-level management is committed to improving A B C D E A B C D E 
quality. 
2. The school system's policy or statements on quality A B C D E A B C D E 
are clearly communicated to all employees. 
3. District-level management is visibly involved in and A B C D E A B C D E 
actively promotes quality within the school system. 
4. District-level management is recognized outside the A B C D E A B C D E 
school district for promoting quality. 
5. The school system supports employees and A B C D E A B C D E 
students to promote quality awareness with 
community, state, national, educational, business 
and other organizations. 
6. School system client focus and quality values are A B C D E A B C D E 
integrated into day-to-day leadership of all operations. 
B. Information and Analysis 
7. Assessment data are used to improve curriculum. A B C D E A B C D E 
instruction, and operations of the system as a whole. 
8. Information is communicated in a systematic A B C D E A B C D E 
marmer. 
9. Adequate procedures are in place to collect data A B C D E A B C D E 
about organizational performance from a variety of 
sources. 
10. Decisions are made based upon collected data and A B C D E A B C D E 
analysis of results. 
11. Improved quality has been the result of data A B C D E A B C D E 
collection and analysis. 
12. The quality of programs and services is compared A B C D E A B C D E 
with those in other school systems. 
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C. Strategic Quality Planning 
13. The system planning process is integrated into A B C D E A B C D E 
daily operations and involves all administrative, 
instructional, and support areas. 
14. Quality tools and techniques are used in the A B C D E A B C D E 
normal planning process. 
15. Each department or unit has a mission, and has A B C D E A B C D E 
identified key processes and client needs. 
16. Continuous improvement is emphasized in district A B C D E A B c D E 
strategic planning efforts. 
17. Information from staff and community is used for A B C D E A B c D E 
strategic planning. 
18 Cooperative teams are formed and used in A B C D E A B c D E 
strategic planning involving all levels of employees. 
D. Human Resource Development and Management 
19. Quality awareness training is made available A B C D E A B c D E 
to all employees on a regular basis. 
20. Employee teams are regularly used to solve A B C D E A B c D E 
district problems. 
21. Empowerment, risk taking and innovation are A B C D E A B c D E 
encouraged and supported. 
22. There are opportunities for individuals and groups A B C D E A B c D E 
to contribute to quality goals and plans. 
23. Individualized professional development plans are A B C D E A B c D E 
used in staff development and training. 
24. Employees are involved in developing their own A B C D E A B c D E 
performance and recognition systems. 
25. Employee satisfaction surveys are conducted on A B C D E A B c D E 
a regular basis. 
E. Management of Process Quality 
26. Validation of program performance and actual A B C D E A B c D E 
results is done regularly. 
27. Articulation among all grade levels in curriculum A B C D E A B c D E 
planning and delivery is encouraged and implemented. 
28. Procedures have been established to reduce student A B C D E A B c D E 
dropout rates. 
29. Advisory committees are extensively used to maintain A B C D E A B c D E 
up-to-date program content and processes. 
30. Reports and findings about results and performance A B C D E A B c D E 
are shared freely with the board, staff, and the 
community. 
31. Quality or performance audits of programs and A B C D E A B c D E 
courses are conducted regularly. 
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F. Quality and Operational Results 
32. Major trends of key programs and services are 
identified and monitored over time. 
33. The number of purchased services and consultant 
assistance contracts have increased over time. 
34. Graduates are continuously tracked and information 
about their placement and status is analyzed. 
35. Strategies are in place to diagnose continuously the 
skills and ability levels of students in key learning 
areas. 
36. The quality of support and services (equipment, 
instructional resources, training, etc.) provided is 
improving. 
37. The quality of the school district is compared 
regularly with other schools' program results and 
performance. 
G. Client Focus and Satisfaction 
38. Procedures for handling inquiries and complaints are A B C D E A B C D E 
well established and operate smoothly. 
39. Surveys are regularly used to obtain student and A B C D E A B C D E 
parent feedbackk. 
40, Post-secondary institution and employer satisfaction A B C D E A B C D E 
with graduates are monitored on a regular basis. 
41. Clear standards are established and employees are A B C D E A B C D E 
taught skills to effectively interact with parents. 
students, employers, and citizens. 
42. Future student curricular and program needs are A B C D E A B C D E 
identified and tied to curriculum development. 
43. Information is gathered frequently to monitor progress A B C D E A B C D E 
and improvement from year to year in all areas. 
44. Special training in helping clients is provided to all A B C D E A B C D E 
professional and support staif on a regular basis. 
45. Client satisfaction with this school district's A B C D E A B C D E 
performance is improving over time. 
A B C D E 
A B C D E 
A B C D E 
A B C D E 
A B C D E 
A B C D E 
A B C D E 
A B C D E 
A B C D E 
A B C D E 
A B C D E 
A B C D E 
Thank you for your help and cooperation! 
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Instrument Validation Panel 
Perceived Quality Instniment 
NAME 
1. Dr. J.C. Dugger 
POSITION/TITLE 
Associate Professor & Chair 
2. Dr. D.A. Johnson Assistant Professor 
3. Dr. S.K. Drake 
4. Dr. R.P. Manatt 
Manager of Training/ 
Development 
Professor 
5. Dr. L.H. Ebbers Professor 
6. Dr. G.W. Chase Associate Professor 
7. Dr. R.W. Stephenson Associate Professor 
8. Dr. P.W. Hetland Manager TQM 
9. Dr. Carolyn Heising Professor 
10. Dr. Elizabeth Hoffman Dean 







Professional Studies in 
Education 
Professional Studies in 
Education 
Civil and Construction 
Engineering 
Statistics 





Liberal Arts and 
Sciences Admin. 
Facilities Planning and 
Management 
